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ABSTRACT 
The Relapse Prevention (RP) approach to the treatment of addictive 
disorders (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985) and the model of the relapse process 
underlying it, is described and critically analysed. Its application to the 
treatment of sex offenders is described and a key RP construct, the 
abstinence violation effect, is critically examined. A reformulation of the 
abstinence violation effect is presented together with a discussion of the 
empirical support for this construct. Classification issues are also 
reviewed. Twenty-six incarcerated male child molesters were assessed, 
using the Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, Doughty, Bloxom, & Kotsch, 
1974) and the Four Attributional Dimension Scale (Benson, 1989), at three 
points (background, lapse, and relapse) while they listened to an 
audiotaped recording of a description of their most typical offence chain. 
Subjects were also classified as either fixated or regressed according to age 
of onset of their offending, quality of the relationship with the victim, 
lifestyle issues, stress, and drug use. 
Eighteen subjects experienced an AVE at the point of relapse and 
seven as the result of a lapse. There were significant increases in most 
negative emotions and decreases in interest over the relapse chain. There 
were significantly higher disgust, contempt, hostility, fear, shame, shyness 
and anger scores reported by those showing an AVE. Conversely the AVE 
group showed significantly lower scores for joy and surprise. There were 
no significant differences on any of the four attributional dimensions across 
the relapse process but those showing an AVE reported significantly more 
uncontrollability and higher stability scores. The results also indicated that 
there appear to be different types of AVE that, in conjunction with the 
generally high levels of positive emotion at the lapse point, reflects the 
important role of emotion in the relapse process. Concerning classification, 
V 
there were no differences in the frequency with which fixated or regressed 
offenders experienced an AVE, although five out of the seven experiencing 
this reaction at the point of lapsing were regressed subjects, as were twelve 
out of eighteen at relapse. Fixated subjects reported more positive emotions 
and less negative emotions than regressed offenders. In addition fixated 
subjects perceived the cause of their offending as more stable than 
regressed offenders. For subjects experiencing the A VE at relapse, those 
classified as fixated saw the cause of the relapse as more stable than did 
regressed subjects. 
The significance of these results for Pithers (1990) RP model, clinical 
practice and research, is discussed, along with limitations of the study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
Sexual abuse of children has received increasing public attention over 
recent years and typically causes feelings of anger and outrage that such 
acts have been committed upon vulnerable individuals. Frequently allied 
with this response is a deeply ingrained pessimism concerning the 
possibility of treating these men, and a belief that therapy represents a "soft 
option" and a waste of money. While these kinds of sentiments are 
perfectly understandable, the reality is that most child molesters get 
released from prison at some point and untreated they are considerably 
more dangerous. While reconviction rates for untreated child molesters are 
around 13%, actual reoffending rates for this group have been estimated to 
be as high as 42%, (Marshall, Jones, Ward, Johnston & Barbaree, 1991). 
Therefore this chronic relapsing feature (Furby, Weinrott, & Blackshaw, 
1989) creates considerable emotional and financial costs and constitutes the 
major puzzle that challenges theory builders and clinicians alike (Haig, 
1987; Hudson, Ward, & Marshall, 1992). 
There is accumulating evidence that sex offenders can be successfully 
treated and a recent review suggests that reoffending rates can be 
considerably reduced by cognitive-behavioural treatment, perhaps by as 
much as two thirds (Marshall et al., 1991). Treatment has also been 
demonstrated to be cost effective and for every man successfully treated the 
state may save up to US $180,000 (Prentky & Burgess, 1990). 
The success of cognitive-behavioural interventions, and the associated 
assumption that the aetiology of problematic behaviours is causally linked 
to problematic cognitions, has led to the consideration of the distorted 
perceptions, beliefs and thinking involved in sexually aggressive behaviour 
(Murphy, 1990; Salter, 1988; Segal & Stermac, 1990). While researchers and 
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clinicians have often noted the important role offenders causal attributions 
play in mediating the transition to reoffending (pithers, 1990; Salter, 1988) 
there has been no empirical evidence to support such observations. 
The high relapse or recidivism rates in sex offenders have been 
thought to be associated with compulsivity or addictive processes (Laws, 
1989; Pithers, 1990). Within the cognitive-behavioural framework this has 
lead to the application of effective treatment strategies from the addiction 
area, such as relapse prevention, to sex offenders. 
In the last decade Relapse Prevention (RP) has emerged as an 
innovative approach both to the conceptualisation and treatment of 
addictive disorders (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985; Wilson, 1992). Marlatt and his 
colleagues (Marlatt 1985a, 1985b; Marlatt, Baer, Donovan, & Kivlahan, 1988; 
Marlatt, Curry, & Gordon, 1988; Marlatt & Gordon, 1991), have produced 
an important body of work that has contributed to understanding the 
processes underlying relapse. They have also developed a number of 
unique strategies and methods for the treatment of addictive behaviour. 
RP procedures aim to enhance clients' self-management skills in order 
to maintain the initial behaviour change induced by therapy. Marlatt's 
conceptualisation has proved remarkably valuable in the field of addiction, 
particularly his observation of commonalities across addictive disorders; 
the presence of short-term satisfaction, delayed negative consequences, the 
probability of high personal and social costs and difficulty in maintaining 
behaviour change (Miller, 1980). RP has attracted much interest from 
clinicians and researchers and the initial outcome literature concerning its 
effectiveness is certainly encouraging (Curry, Marlatt, Gordon, & Baer, 
1988; Gossop, 1989; Laws, 1989; Marshall et aL, 1991; Wilson, 1992). 
The relapse prevention model has been extended to sex offenders by a 
number of clinicians and researchers, (Laws, 1989; Marshall, Hudson, & 
Ward, 1992; Pithers, Marques, Gibat, & Marlatt, 1983). Pithers and his 
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colleagues (pithers & Cumming, 1989; Pithers, Cumming, Beal, Young, & 
Turner, 1989; Pithers, Martin, & Cumming, 1989) developed the Vermont 
Treatment Programme for sex offenders and their initial outcome data is 
encouraging. At this stage only 3% of child sex offenders graduating from 
their programme have re-offended (Marshall et al., 1991). Pithers has 
modified Marlatt's cognitive-behavioural model of the relapse process for 
sex offenders. Other programmes using an RP approach or component 
include the Atascadero Programme (Marques, Day, Nelson, & Miner, 
1989), the Kia Marama programme in New Zealand (Marshall, Johnston, 
Ward, Jones & Hudson, 1992) and a number of Canadian programmes 
established by Marshall and his colleagues (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990a). 
In the RP model, a careful distinction is made between an initial loss 
of control or lapse, and relapse;- a return to problematic levels of addiction 
or prohibited behaviour (Mackay & Marlatt, 1991). Marlatt hypothesises 
that intervening between the lapse and relapse is a process called the 
Abstinence Violation Effect (A VE). This includes a causal search and 
attribution for the cause or reason for the lapse and the affective reaction to 
this attribution. In essence, how an individual views the initial lapse is 
predictive of his or her ability to successfully resume compliance with their 
restraint or abstinence rules. 
The AVE is a core component of the relapse process and research into 
the cognitive and affective processes underlying it is both clinically and 
theoretically important. There has been no empirical research into the AVE 
in sex offenders and little in the general addiction area. The work that has 
been done has tended to rely upon Marlatt's formulation. However there 
are a number of difficulties with his version of the AVE, which in turn, have 
limited the quality of the research into its components. In this thesis I will 
present a reformulation of the A VE that I believe avoids these problems and 
which lead to more fruitful research possibilities, as well as relevant data. 
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However before analysing this important construct further, I will discuss 
the RP model as developed by Marlatt and his colleagues. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE RELAPSE PREVENTION MODEL 
In this chapter I will examine Marlatt's RP model in a more 
comprehensive manner. Although Marlatt presents a model of the relapse 
process, his exposition lacks clarity at times. Rather than a fully fleshed out 
theory of relapse, his work contains a set of theoretical assumptions and 
lower level clinical models to guide therapy. This lack of clarity is 
understandable as the development of new theories, inevitably creates some 
degree of initial conceptual looseness. 
There are alternative models describing the development (aetiology) 
and treatment of addictive disorders, as well as influential behavioural 
theories of relapse in the area of addiction. I will describe each in turn to 
help place RP in a theoretical and clinical context. Secondly, I will critically 
examine the generic RP model and then discuss Pithers extension of this 
approach to sex offenders. 
CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF ADDICTION 
Brickman, Rabinowitiz, Karuza, Coates, Cohn et al., (1982) have 
developed a conceptual framework for comparing and contrasting models 
of addiction, that essentially revolves around two key questions: (a) To 
what extent is the person responsible for developing the addiction, and (b) 
to what extent is the person responsible for solving the addiction problem? 
Four conceptual models can be derived from the answers to these 
questions. 
In the moral model of addiction, the person is responsible both for the 
development and the changing of their addictive behaviour. Frequently 
addiction is viewed as an indication of weak character and change is 
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thought to occur through an exercise of willpower. According to Baer and 
Marlatt (1988), this model has received little empirical support in the 
addiction's literature. 
The disease/medical model of addiction attributes no responsibility to 
the addicted individual for either the development or treatment of his /her 
problem. Addiction is conceptualised as an underlying disease process 
with an emphasis on physical dependency, genetic vulnerability and a 
belief that the "disease" is progressive. An advantage with this model is 
that the addict can seek help without feeling blamed for his problem. 
However, it fails to convincingly account for commonalities across the 
various addictions or situations where people independently solve their 
own addiction problems. 
In the enlightenment model, individuals are seen as responsible for 
the acquisition of their addiction but not for changing their behaviour. An 
assumption of this approach is that change is only possible if a person is 
enlightened regarding the true nature of their addiction and thereby by 
relinquishing personal control to a higher power or collective entity. The 
various self-help groups, such as Alcoholics or Narcotics Anonymous, are 
thought to rely on this model. 
Finally, in the compensation model the person is held personally 
responsible for change, but not for the development of their addiction. In 
this approach, aetiology is typically viewed as involving biological and 
learning factors beyond an individual's control. Addiction is viewed as 
learned maladaptive or dysfunctional behaviour that occurs in the context 
of personal and environmental factors. RP is an example of a compensatory 
modeL According to Baer and Marlatt (1988), treatment approaches 
derived from this conceptual model are well supported in the addiction 
literature. 
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HEHA VIOURAL MODELS OF RELAPSE 
There have been three influential behavioural theories of relapse in 
the addictions area, the withdrawal, compensatory, and appetitive models, 
(Niaura, Rohsenow, Binkoff, Monti, Pedraza et al., 1988). In the 
conditioned withdrawal model of relapse, whenever the individual 
experiences environmental or internal cues that were associated with drug 
effects or withdrawal, he/ she will experience a conditioned response 
resembling the withdrawal state (Wilder, 1980). The cues or conditioned 
stimuli eliciting these symptoms could include drugs similar in action to the 
drug of abuse or mood states associated with drug taking. This may lead to 
increased drug seeking behaviour to eradicate these unpleasant symptoms, 
and eventually lead to relapse. . 
The conditioned compensatory response relapse model was 
developed by Siegel (1983) to explain the development of drug tolerance. 
From this perspective, the environmental cues or stimuli that are repeatedly 
associated with drug use become conditioned stimuli and will evoke a 
conditioned response. A key assumption is that the conditioned responses 
are opposite in direction to the unconditioned responses or direct 
pharmacological action of the drug. This is thought to compensate for the 
anticipated drug effects and in this way, maintains a homeostatic balance. 
Drug seeking behaviour may be motivated by the attempt to avoid or 
escape the conditioned responses, therefore increasing the chances of 
relapse. 
The final behavioural model of relapse is the conditioned appetitive 
theory (Stewart, de Wit, & Eikelboom, 1984). In this approach, the positive 
incentive value of drugs plays the major role in substance abuse and drug 
taking is thought to be maintained by appetitive motivational processes 
rather than by the desire to escape or avoid withdrawal symptoms. 
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Through conditioning stimuli come to elicit a positive motivational state 
similar to that created directly by the drug in question. This positive 
motivational state is characterised by increases in drug related thoughts 
and cravings, and drug seeking behaviour. Withdrawal symptoms are 
believed to be conditioned stimuli that elicit positive affect rather than 
conditioned responses. The research evidence at this point tends to support 
the appetitive theory (Niaura et al., 1988; Rohsenow, Niaura, Childress, 
Abrams, & Monti, 1991). 
MARLA 'ITS RELAPSE PREVENTION MODEL 
In the development of the RP model Marlatt uses methods and 
concepts from a diverse range of psychological theories, for example, social 
learning theory (Bandura, 1977), attributional theory (Weiner, 1972), self-
awareness theory (Duval & Wickland, 1972). A particularly striking feature 
of RP is its capacity to draw together the strands of quite different 
theoretical and therapeutic traditions, although it is essentially based upon 
social learning theory (Bandura, 1986). 
In RP addictive behaviours are viewed as learnt, maladaptive 
responses to specific problems and therefore serve a function or number of 
functions. For example, alcohol can be used to escape from or avoid 
negative affect, or to enhance self-esteem. Because addictive behaviour is 
learnt, a major therapeutic goal is control or self-management rather than 
"cure". Related to this assumption, the difference between normal and 
maladaptive use of alcohol, for example, is seen as one of degree rather 
than kind. Therefore addiction is construed in dimensional rather than in 
categorical terms, with problematic behaviours at one end of the dimension 
and adaptive use at the other. 
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According to the RP model, there are no single factors involved in the 
aetiology or relapse of addictive disorders. Rather, in both cases a number 
of factors are influential, depending upon the situation or stage of 
treatment. In the RP model, psychological factors playa major role 
particularly the perception and interpretation of internal and external 
events (Abrams & Niaura, 1987). How an individual labels an urge to 
drink, for example, will influence the degree to which he/she attempts to 
control subsequent alcohol use. This is in marked contrast to biological 
models of addiction where physical processes are viewed as fundamental 
(Marlatt, Baer, Donovan, & Kivlahan, 1988). 
The major therapeutic task in RP is to teach clients who are motivated 
to change their addictive behaviour to identify, anticipate, and cope with 
the problem of relapse and its antecedents. The therapy model is based on 
the construct of the relapse process. A major assumption is that relapse 
occurs in discrete steps over time rather than unexpectedly. It is not seen as 
an all or nothing phenomenon where a person moves from abstinence 
directly to a state of relapse. The challenging of this dichotomous view of 
relapse, usually associated with the disease model of addiction, has been 
one of Marlatt's seminal achievements (Brownell, Marlatt, Lichtenstein, & 
Wilson, 1986; Donovan & Chaney, 1985). 
One of the most important distinctions in the RP model is that 
between a lapse, the initial occurrence of a prohibited behaviour, and a 
relapse, a return to problematic levels of addictive behaviour (Mackay & 
Marlatt, 1991; Saunders & Allsop, 1987). One of the unfortunate 
implications of the disease model of addiction is the collapsing or merging 
of these two separate stages in the relapse process. This tendency may in 
part explain the finding that the majority of people who experience a lapse 
end up relapsing (Brownell et al., 1986; Marlatt & Gordon, 1991; Rohsenow 
et al., 1991). 
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Although Marlatt incorporates conditioning processes into his model 
of relapse, his is essentially a social learning theoretical perspective. To 
briefly summarise, in contrast to the medical! disease model, the person 
treated according to RP principles is held responsible for the change 
process. In addition, aetiology is viewed as multi-factorial and addiction 
thought to consist of maladaptive or dysfunctional behaviour that is 
maintained by its consequences. Cognitive factors play an important role in 
both relapse and treatment. 
THE RELAPSE PROCESS 
The RP approach to treatment is directly related to a particular view 
of relapse. I will now describe this model of relapse in some detail as it is 
necessary to be familiar with it to understand the role of the A VB in sexual 
aggression. For ease of discussion it is helpful to divide the relapse process 
into three components, that is, events and processes that (a) lead 
individuals to high risk situations that set the scene for a possible relapse, 
(b) lead from high risk situations to a lapse and, (c) facilitate the transition 
from a lapse to a relapse. 
Factors leading to high risk situations 
HRSs are defined as when a person's sense of control over behaviour 
relevant to his/her addiction is threatened, for example, when an alcoholic 
is offered a drink in his favourite bar. HRSs may refer to external 
situations, such as being in a bar, or to internal states, for example, feeling 
anxious, angry or depressed. 
When the negative influences in a person's life outweigh the positive 
(lifestyle imbalance) and he/she lacks the resources for coping with this, 
stress is experienced. This may lead to a desire for indulgence, a sense of 
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deserving or being entitled to something pleasurable. There are three 
major sources of stress that lead to HRSs; life events, daily hassles and a 
marked discrepancy between obligations and benefits. These lead to the 
sense of being deprived alluded to above and a consequent return of urges 
and cravings for a particular substance or activity. 
Additionally, associated with the abstinence state is frequently a sense 
of resentment at being denied choice. This can lead to a desire to test out 
control by engaging in addictive behaviour (Brehm, 1966). Associated with 
this craving and desire for indulgence, are a number of cognitive distortions 
and maladaptive decisions that in a real sense set the stage for a lapse, and 
possible subsequent relapse. 
There are three major pathways to HRSs in Marlatt's model. The first 
occurs when a person is unexpectedly placed in a situation he / she has 
difficulty managing, for example, being offered a smoke by a superior at 
work. A second pathway involves difficulty coping with stressors. This 
results in the person feeling overwhelmed and falling back on old "coping" 
behaviours, that is, addictive behaviour. The third major pathway to HRSs 
involves apparently irrelevant decisions, (AIDs). Marlatt labels this 
pathway, the covert antecedents of relapse (see figure 1). AIDs are "mini-
decisions" or choices that superficially appear to be reasonable and 
unrelated to addiction, but which collectively help set up HRSs and 
therefore increase the chances of relapsing. They frequently appear 
acceptable, even praiseworthy, but are motivated primarily by the urge to 
indulge in a "prohibited" behaviour. The individual may not be fully aware 
of the motives behind these decisions. AIDs function to avoid self-criticism 
and social disapproval and provide an excuse for lapsing. For example, an 
alcoholic who just happens to go for a walk by his favourite 
Lifestyle imbalance 
(shoulds> wants) 
Desire for 
indulgence or 
Immediate 
gratification (I 
owe myself a 
drink) 
Urges or 
cravings 
mediated by 
expectancies 
for Immediate 
effects of 
substance 
Rationalization, 
denial, and AIDs 
(apparently 
irrelevant 
decisions) 
Fig. 1 Covert antecedents of a relapse situation 
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High risk 
situation 
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drinking spot, lapses and then claims "it was impossible to resist the urge to 
drink". These decisions are invariably accompanied by cognitive 
distortions that serve to obscure individuals' real motives and to legitimise 
their behaviour. For example, when accepting a request to babysit a young 
child, a sex offender reassures himself "I'm just helping a friend". 
Marlatt draws upon the work of Janis and Mann (1977) in his 
discussion of the various maladaptive decision-making strategies' people 
use to set up HRSs. Janis and Mann (1977) argue that all decisions involve 
conflict resolution and therefore presuppose conflict over possible options 
and alternatives. The major type of maladaptive decision-making 
associated with AIDs is defensive avoidance Ganis & Mann 1977). In 
defensive avoidance, an individual escapes from conflict by 
procrastinating, shifting responsibility to others, and by rationalisation. 
This latter strategy involves minimising or denying the negative 
consequences of decisions and magnifying the perceived benefits. 
The degree of initial commitment to abstinence is an important factor 
that influences which pathway to a HRS is likely to be taken .. Clearly 
individuals who have made a public declaration of an intention to change, 
and who have previously successfully complied with their abstinence rules, 
would find it embarrassing to simply resume their addictive behaviour. 
The desire or need to indulge would clash with the need to avoid social 
disapproval and self-criticism. 
From high risk situations to a lapse 
Lifestyle imbalance can lead to HRSs directly, or indirectly by the way 
of AIDs. Once a person is in a HRS he/she is particularly vulnerable to 
lapsing. As discussed above, addictive behaviours are viewed as learnt, 
maladaptive responses to specific problems and therefore serve a function 
or number of functions. Without effective coping skills an individual is 
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more likely to fall back upon addictive substances or activities in order to 
escape from, or cope with, the HRS. 
Clearly HRSs are definitionally a threat to an individual's 
commitment to abstinence. There is conflict between the desire to maintain 
control and the desire to indulge in the addictive behaviour. One of the 
major difficulties with the AIDs pathway to HRSs is the avoidance of 
awareness and responsibility for the decisions creating these situations. 
This makes it less likely that a person will be prepared for, or cope 
effectively with, these stressful events. 
There are a number of factors that place someone at risk for relapsing. 
Marlatt describes three major types of HRSs that can lead to relapse in 
different addictive disorders; negative emotional states, interpersonal 
conflict, and social pressure. 
Once in a HRS, skills that enable an individual to cope effectively with 
the threat to abstinence are of crucial importance (see figure 2). Effective 
coping results in increased self-efficacy (Bandura, 1989) and a consequent 
strengthening of the perception of control. This, in turn, leads to a lowered 
risk for relapse. If, however, someone fails to respond adaptively to a HRS, 
his/her chances of lapsing, and ultimately relapsing, are considerably 
increased. 
Skill deficits, maladaptive decision making strategies and the failure 
to recognise the risks associated with HRS combine to reduce the chances of 
effective coping. The failure to deal adaptively with a HRS leads to 
decreased self-efficacy and an increased sense of hopelessness. These 
factors, in conjunction with a strong attraction to the prohibited substance 
or activity (urges and cravings), and positive outcome expectations, result 
in a lapse occurring. That is, an initial use of the substance or occurrence of 
an addictive behaviour. 
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Decreased 
...... 
,. Coping ..... Increased .... probability 
.", 7 
response self-efficacy of relapse 
High-risk 
situation 
Decreased 
self-efficacy Abstinence 
No coping Initial use violation effect: 
4 response ~ Positive ~ of ~ ~ Increased 
outcome substance Dissonance conflict 
probability 
expectancies and self·attribution 
of relapse 
(for initial (guilt and perceived 
effects of loss of control) 
substance) 
Fig. 2 A cognitive-behavioral model of the relapse process 
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There are a number of mechanisms or processes that are hypothesised 
to mediate and assist this transition from a HRS to a lapse, and eventually a 
relapse. The first of these is the problem of immediate gratification (PIG) 
which results in the filtering out or ignoring of both short-term and long-
term negative consequences of lapsing. The focus on immediate 
pleasurable features, in association with impaired decision making, 
increases the chances of a lapse occurring. Secondly when an individual 
lacks an alternative coping strategy this increases his/her reliance on and 
attraction to old coping responses, that is, addictive behaviour. 
Thirdly, once a person has lapsed then the biphasic effect of drugs or 
addictive substances function to intensify the initial positive experience. In 
this effect, a drug or addictive behaviour has an initial high or positive 
effect with delayed negative consequences. 
Fourthly, whether an initial violation of abstinence rules (a lapse) 
result in relapse, depends on the strength of the consequent effect of this 
behaviour, that is, the Abstinence Violation Effect (AVE). I will now 
describe this construct in detail. 
From a lapse to relapse 
The AVE is said to be a complex cognitive/ affective reaction to an initial 
violation of an abstinence rule forbidding or restricting a particular 
behaviour. Its strength depends on the strength of commitment to 
abstinence, the degree to which a person can justify the lapse, the presence 
of significant others, the personal cost of maintaining abstinence on 
previous occasions and the length of the period of abstinence. It is a 
dimensional phenomenon varying in intensity with relapse being 
associated with a more intense A VE. Marlatt has developed two versions 
of this important construct. His first definition of the A VE contains a 
cognitive dissonance effect and an attribution concerning the cause of the 
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lapse (Marlatt & Gordon, 1980). In the cognitive dissonance effect, there is 
conflict between an individual's perception of himself or herself as an 
abstainer, and the recent experience of lapsing. The individual may resolve 
the conflict created by this inconsistency by modifying his/her self image, 
that is, view themselves as addicts. An attribution made to personal 
characteristics may intensify the A VB. Marlatt was dissatisfied with this 
model of the A VB and drew upon the social cognitive literature to 
reformulate it (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). In the most recent version of 
Marlatt's theory, the A VB is seen as having two major components, an 
attribution as to the cause of the lapse and the affective reaction to this 
attribution (George & Marlatt, 1989; Marlatt & Gordon, 1985). 
The essence of Marlatt's description of the A VB is that how 
individuals view the initial lapse is predictive of their ability to successfully 
resume compliance with the restraint or abstinence rule. The "how" is a 
consequence of a multi-step process. For example, when a person 
abstaining from smoking lapses by lighting a cigarette, the distinctiveness 
of his/her behaviour leads to increased self-attention (see figure 3). A 
causal search is instigated ("why did it happen?") and the lapse is 
evaluated, particularly in terms of individual responsibility. H the causal 
attribution for the lapse is made to external, unstable and specific factors 
such as "I was forced to take this cigarette so as not to offend my boss", the 
A VB is likely to be minimal and thus the probability of a full-blown relapse 
is low. H on the other hand, the causal attribution for the lapse is made to 
internal, dispositional factors such as "I have no willpower", then the 
person would experience a negative emotional reaction and loss of control. 
In addition, the comparison of the immediate behaviour to ideal standards 
may produce feelings of guilt and self-blame. This negative affect and the 
associated perceived loss of self-control, is aversive and as such has 
motivational properties. Specifically, aversive emotional states typically 
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energise over-learnt dominant responses such as old addictive behaviours. 
In addition, an individual may attempt to reduce the consequent cognitive 
dissonance by redefining his/her self-image in line with the ongoing, 
addictive behaviour, for example, "I'm just an addict". There is a 
generalised decrement in expectations of future coping and perceived self-
efficacy concerning abstinence and as a consequence, continuation of the 
forbidden behaviour. In other words a relapse has occurred. Each further 
use of the substance or occurrence of the prohibited behaviour increases 
this effect and creates a vicious addictive circle. 
Marlatt formulated a number of attributional hypotheses concerning 
the perceived cause of the lapse. He argues that attributions of causality to: 
(1) internal factors such as an underlying disease will increase the 
probability of relapse; 
(2) external factors, such as work pressures, will decrease the chances of 
relapse; 
(3) motivational deficits, for example a lack of willpower, will increase 
relapse chances; 
(4) deficits in coping skills will reduce the probability of relapse 
occurring. 
RELAPSE PREVENTION AND THERAPY 
The RP model has been researched in a number of areas including 
smoking (Baer & Marlatt, 1991; Curry, Marlatt, & Gordon, 1987; Shiffman, 
1989), alcohol dependence (Ito, Donovan, & Hall, 1988), sex offenders 
(Marshall et al., 1992) drug abuse (Birke, Edelman, & Davis, 1990), bulimia 
nervosa Gohnson & Connors, 1987), diabetes (Kirkley & Fisher, 1988) and 
obesity (Schlundt, Hill, Sbrocco, Pope-Cordle, & Kasser, 1989). It has 
recently been extended into non-traditional areas such as schizophrenia, 
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marital therapy, social competence, chronic pain and anxiety disorders 
(Wilson, 1992). 
Consistent with its cognitive-behavioural focus, RP distinguishes 
between initial and maintaining causal factors. Individuals may have skill 
deficits that have predisposed them to develop difficulties with drugs or 
alcohol. However, once the problematic behaviour is acquired, its 
consequences function to maintain it independently of these vulnerability 
factors. 
RP can be used as an "umbrella" approach organising the whole of 
treatment or as an additional module or component (George & Marlatt, 
1989; Marshall, Hudson, & Ward, 1992). The RP emphasis on the 
development of self management skills, particularly those associated with 
maintenance, is markedly different from more traditional relapse treatment 
models (Mackay & Marlatt, 1991). In these approaches' individuals 
typically either attend "booster" sessions or make a lifelong commitment to 
treatment. Some programmes also adopt a "shotgun" strategy, where more 
and more elements are added to therapy, without theoretical rationale, in 
the hope relapse will be avoided. 
In Marlatt's treatment approach, global and specific treatment 
strategies are derived from his model of the relapse process. He maintains 
the importance of imparting to the person "the big picture" or broad view of 
relapse early in therapy. This helps to increase motivation by identifying a 
series of proximal and distal goals involved in the recovery journey. 
RP's treatment is cognitive-behavioural. The skill deficits that have 
predisposed a person to become addicted are explicitly targeted in 
association with reconditioning strategies to extinguish the urge to engage 
in the addictive behaviour. Typically this involves learning problem-
solving, social, relationship, stress management, and lifestyle skills. In 
addition, individuals learn a variety of meta-cognitive skills that enable 
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them to monitor their own internal processes and the envirorunent for 
HRSs. The choice of particular techniques depends upon the type of factors 
that are related to a particular offender's sexual aggression (e.g., biological 
or cognitive) and on what is modifiable in the particular situation. 
The following is a (fictitious) example of the match of therapy 
techniques with points in the relapse process. John is a man who has 
sexually offended against his daughter. Assessment reveals that he is 
working two jobs and spends most of his spare time renovating the house. 
He has very few friends and finds talking about his feelings extremely 
difficult. His relationship with his wife is characterised by mutual 
frustration and self defeating attempts to solve their marital problems. He 
uses alcohol to relax and to help him avoid thinking about his many 
problems. He had begun to watch pornographic videos and masturbate to 
fantasies based on this material since sexually abusing his daughter. 
The RP approach to therapy involves specifically addressing each of 
the components of the relapse process. The desire for indulgence resulting 
from lifestyle imbalance is addressed by balancing daily activities and 
including positive addictions such as jogging. In addition, substitute 
indulgences, for example taking up a hobby, replace the prohibited 
behaviour. Coping imagery, stimulus control procedures and 
reconditioning techniques are used to reduce urges and cravings. The 
learning of more effective problem-solving and decision-making skills 
lessens the frequency and impact of HRSs and lapses. John learns how to 
counter the A VE by using cognitive restructuring and reattributional 
strategies. 
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PROBLEMS WITH MARLA ITS RP MODEL 
I will now focus on the problems in Marlatt's RP model. The majority 
of my criticisms are conceptual. An important part of theory development 
involves conceptual appraisal alongside empirical evaluation. One of the 
unfortunate legacies of the narrow empiricist view of science bequeathed 
by radical behaviourism has been a distrust of theory and a corresponding 
overemphasis on data (Haig, 1987; Hooker, 1987). Theoretical advances 
lead to better empirical research and ultimately, more effective 
interventions (Staats, 1991). 
The RP model is a relatively new approach and therefore it is still too 
early to be dear about its effectiveness (Ito, Donovan, & Hall, 1988). Much 
of the early treatment outcome research in the sex offender area is 
supportive, although there have been some exceptions (Marshall et al., 
1991). This form of cognitive-behavioural therapy appears to be 
particularly effective with child molesters, while other types of sex 
offenders such as exhibitionists, do not do as well (Marshall et al., 1991). 
Along with the limited amount of treatment outcome research, there 
has been little conceptual criticism of the RP model. An exception to this is 
the work of Allsop and Saunders (Allsop & Saunders, 1987; Saunders & 
Allsop, 1987, 1989) who while approving of much in the RP approach to 
relapse, have consistently challenged Marlatt's emphasis on coping skill 
deficits and HRSs in his model, and what they see as his under-emphasis of 
decision making processes. 
They place a great deal of importance on the addict's decision to use 
drugs and believe that the process of relapse is very much influenced by the 
quality of the initial resolution to remain abstinent or control drug use. 
They also draw upon the work of Janis and Mann (1977) to partially explain 
the high relapse rates in the addictive disorders, and see decision making as 
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an integral part of recovering from addiction. The decision to remain 
abstinent involves a weighing up of the values associated with drug taking 
versus those of a drug free life. 
As mentioned above, the two most impressive aspects of Marlatt's 
work have been his ability to draw upon diverse psychological theories and 
to provide a description of the process of relapse. He has used self-
awareness theories (Duval & Wickland, 1972; Storms & McCaul, 1976), 
cognitive dissonance theory (Fe stinger, 1964), self-efficacy theory (Bandura, 
1977), drive theory (Spence & Spence, 1966), attributional theory (Weiner, 
1972), self-regulation theory (Carver & Scheier, 1981), decision theory (Janis 
& Mann, 1977), operant learning theory (Skinner, 1974), classical 
conditioning (Hilgard & Bower, 1975) to mention only the most important. 
The attempt to integrate such diverse theories has however, made 
Marlatt's analysis cumbersome and confusing in places. He frequently 
hypothesises the existence of a number of mechanisms to account for the 
relapse process that either conflict or creates theoretical redundancies. 
Although Marlatt stresses the importance of interaction between the 
multiple factors leading both to the establishment of addictive disorders 
and relapse, his RP model does not adequately reflect these relationships 
(see figures 1 & 2). He does not convincingly address the relationships 
between lapses, HRSs, AIDs and so on. Individuals with addictive 
disorders who are committed to abstinence, do not tend to relapse in a 
dichotomous fashion (Birke et al., 1990; Ogden & Wardle, 1990; Polivy & 
Herman, 1991; Saunders & Allsop, 1987). Frequently there are a number of 
feedback loops or interactions between the various components that 
eventually may lead to relapse (Hall, 1989; Kirkley & Fisher, 1988; Saunders 
& Allsop, 1989; Saunders & Allsop, 1987). 
A related issue is the difficulty determining the point at which the 
lapse becomes a relapse (Mackay & Marlatt, 1991). Is relapse a return to an 
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individual's previous level, for example, of drug taking, or simply use that 
leads to life problems? Clearly, differences in defining a lapse lead to 
different definitions of relapse; these are logically related. 
Marlatt places a great deal of emphasis on the role of AIDs in setting 
up HRSs and ultimately relapse. He links the use of maladaptive decision 
making strategies, for example defensive avoidance, with such covert 
planning. When people are under stress their capacity to think clearly and 
make decisions is adversely affected (Marlatt, 1985b). For example, 
thinking tends to be more simplistic and concrete and the memory span is 
reduced. Marlatt argues that the desire to avoid self criticism and social 
disapproval results in covert planning and the setting up of relapse 
possibilities. The major problem with his explanation is that it is not clear 
how such planning occurs and what underlying mechanisms are involved. 
It seems to require unconscious thinking and defence mechanisms that 
involve complex cognitive processes inaccessible to consciousness. This 
raises more questions than it answers. For one thing, it doesn1t explain how 
an individual whose thinking is adversely affected by stress manages to 
carefully plan and set up lapse/relapse opportunities. What is the 
relationship between the surface cognitive distortions and the underlying 
covert plans and goals? Marlatt seems to place a large burden on the 
cognitive capacity and processes of individuals who are struggling to 
comply with their abstinence rules. Certainly many clinicians have noted 
the importance of planning regarding relapse and the person1s reported 
lack of awareness of this. However, Marlatt has arguably merely described 
this phenomenon, not explained it. 
Related to this point, is the criticism that Marlatt appears to support 
the existence of unconscious desires. He argues that AIDs are preceded by 
a desire for indulgence, for example, 111 owe myself a drink1l. This is said to 
be part of the process that leads to the setting up of HRSs by the way of 
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AIDs. Either this desire is unconscious or else the relationship between this 
(conscious) desire and subsequent events remains unnoticed. This appears 
to be implausible; the problem is to account for this desire without invoking 
the "unconscious". One of the major assumptions of mainstream cognitive-
behavioural therapeutic approaches is that there is no need to resort to the 
concept of a dynamic unconscious to explain human behaviour (Dobson, 
1988). 
It is not clear why a person who is committed to abstinence fails to 
cope effectively in HRSs. Marlatt makes the assumption that he/she lacks 
adequate coping skills. However, there is some doubt about this and a 
major puzzle in the addiction area is why people report lapsing in 
situations where they would normally cope (Allsop & Saunders, 1989; 
. Rohsenow et a1., 1991; Saunders & Allsop, 1987; Saunders & Allsop, 1989; 
Ward & Hudson 1992). Why do they fail to use their coping skills in these 
HRSs on some occasions? 
A criticism concerns Marlatt's definition of HRSs. It appears that 
different types of HRSs play different roles in relapse and are associated 
with different mechanisms. For example, for someone who is in a situation 
containing addictive stimuli (e.g., a bar) a lack of skill alone may result in a 
lapse and perhaps a relapse. However, for a person who is alone without 
any such addictive substances and who is feeling depressed, further steps 
are needed which ultimately involve either entering such an environment 
(Le., an additional HRS), or purchasing alcohol and so on. Marlatt does not 
make these important distinctions. 
Related to this is the problem of defining HRSs in phenomenological 
terms, that is, where a person's sense of control over behaviour related to 
his/her addiction is threatened. This is a problem because it fails to 
account for a number of possible situations. First, if cognitive distortions 
are present, then the person may not recognise the HRS as a threat to 
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his/her control. However arguably it would still make sense to speak of 
the situation constituting a HRS when you take into account his/her 
addictive behaviour history. Secondly, there is the reverse situation where 
a person feels his/her control is threatened but realistically there is little 
possibility of him/her lapsing. In this situation, they may be excessively 
anxious and therefore hypervigilant. It would be useful to narrow the 
definition of a HRS to external situations where the appropriate addictive 
stimuli are present. Internal factors would then become risk factors or high 
risk elements that may lead to HRSs by the way of AIDs or other 
mechanisms. 
There appear to be several mechanisms suggested by Marlatt that 
mediate the transition from a HRS to a lapse. Marlatt argues that before 
. lapsing an individual experiences a loss (or lessening) of control,lowered 
self-efficacy and a sense of helplessness as a consequence of not coping. 
This leads to negative affect and a consequent reliance on old coping 
strategies, that is, engaging in addictive behaviour. Marlatt does not 
acknowledge the possible independence of these mechanisms. It is 
desirable when theory building to seek simpler explanations (Hooker, 1987; 
Newton-Smith,1983). It is possible that individuals could lapse in a HRS 
simply because they lack the skills to cope effectively. For example, a 
person who lacks the assertiveness skills to refuse his boss's offer of a drink. 
This could lead to a lapse and a possible AVE. Of course, he may excuse his 
"mistake" by blaming his employer. 
Second, the negative affect created by lifestyle imbalance, could result 
in a failure to employ assertiveness skills present in the individual's 
repertoire in the above situation. The individual remains passive, 
frequently seeing him/herself as deserving the indulgences anyway, and 
does not actively attempt to cope with the HRS. This leads directly to a 
lapse. 
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Third, negative affect created by lifestyle imbalance (e.g., a HR.') 
could lead to the direct activation of old (addictive) coping strategies and 
result in a lapse. ill this situation, there is an active decision to use a 
particular coping strategy, for example drinking alcohol, to escape from 
negative affect. 
Fourth, the negative affect created by lowered self-efficacy with 
respect to restraint, loss of control and helplessness could lead to the use of 
addictive substances or behaviours to cope. This is a different type of 
negative affect than that mentioned above as it emerges as a result of a 
failure to manage early aspects of a HRS, rather than from precursors to the 
HRS such as lifestyle imbalances. 
Fifth, the lack of coping and lowered levels of self-efficacy could be 
mediated by attributions that lead to the perception of diminished control. 
This is a relatively pure cognitive pathway. 
Sixth, the exclusive focus on the immediate and pleasurable 
consequences in a HRS and the consequent narrowing of attention and 
therefore problem solving options, could result in a lapse. This is what 
Marlatt terms the Problem of Immediate Gratification (PIG). 
This difficulty is a result of heterogeneity in types of HRS, each of 
which involve potentially different transition mechanisms. For example, in 
a more situationally defined HRS such as being in a bar, the presence of 
alcohol could result in a lapse in association with a lack of coping skills. 
Whereas in a situation where the HRS is more internal, such as the example 
of depression, a lack of coping skills would not be enough to lead directly 
to a lapse, the availability of alcohol would be required, and perhaps, an 
active decision to drink. 
A related criticism involves the important role of motivation invoked 
by Marlatt in explaining the shift from a HRS to a lapse. The perceived 
attraction of the addictive substance or activity is viewed as out-weighing 
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the longer term negative consequences. The problem is that Marlatt 
collapses two different motivational processes that could arguably function 
quite independently. First, he argues that the urges/cravings elicited by 
stimuli in HRSs function to push or drive the individual to indulge; a 
conditioning perspective. Alternatively however, he emphasises the 
importance of expectations in facilitating the transition from a HRS to a 
lapse; a cognitive perspective. These processes can function quite 
independentl y and it is confusing to combine them in this manner. In 
Marlatt's model it is not clear whether a lapse occurs because of low efficacy 
concerning restraint or over-whelming urges to indulge. Of course both 
processes may function in conjunction as well as individually. Perhaps 
each has a role to play in different HRSs, or additionally, each may be 
differentially important in different addictive disorders, or in different 
individuals. 
There are also a number of problems with Marlatt's formulation of the 
Abstinence Violation Effect. I will only make one general criticism 
concerning Marlatt's version of the AVE at this time and will address this 
issue more fully in the next chapter. As described above, the AVE is a 
cognitive/ affective reaction to an initial violation of an abstinence rule 
forbidding or restricting a particular behaviour (George & Marlatt 1989; 
Marlatt, 1985a, 1985b). This reaction is an important mediator of relapse 
and as such in part determines whether or not a lapse becomes a full-blown 
relapse. How individuals view the initial lapse determines in part whether 
or not they resume adherence to their abstinence rules. 
Briefly, although Marlatt claims that his formulation of the AVE only 
uses attributions and affective processes, in actuality he implicitly draws 
upon a diverse set of ideas and theories, and this creates problems. The 
major difficulty is that he postulates a number of competing mechanisms 
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that underlie the AVE that appear to operate quite independently, and even 
conflict with each other. 
An example of this problem is the confusion engendered by the 
introduction of the biphasic concept. Marlatt argues that the initial effect of 
taking drugs or indulging in addictive behaviour is a positive one and that 
negative effects occur later. However, if this is the case, when does the AVE 
occur and what is its relationship to the biphasic effect? Certainly, if the 
two processes occur in conjunction, there must be a time lapse while the 
positive effects of the drugs or addictive behaviour recede. How long does 
this need to be and how does this apply to different addictive substances or 
activities? A related difficulty is the assumed delayed negative effect of 
biphasic responses. If this involves negative affect (and it seems to) why do 
you need the AVE? It becomes redundant if there is already a link between 
negative affect and addictive "coping responses", which Marlatt maintains. 
Does the biphasic effect involve biological or psychological mechanisms, or 
both? If attributions are involved, what is their role? The major problem is 
that in Marlatt's ,RP model there are multiple pathways to continued 
addictive behaviour. It is not clear whether the mechanisms underlying 
these are related or whether they can even be theoretically integrated. 
There is some evidence to suggest that the A VE is not a stable 
phenomenon (Collins & Lapp, 1991; Hall, 1989; Ward & Hudson, 1992) with 
Marlatt (1985b) himself arguing that an individual may only experience it 
briefly. A significant puzzle is to account for this instability. Certainly, 
taking into account the biphasic effect of addictive substances, it is clear 
that for Marlatt the initial effect of taking drugs or indulging in an addictive 
behaviour is positive. What is the relationship between the AVE and the 
(arguably) appetitive processes associated with this positive effect? Does 
this lead to some attenuation of the AVE, and do mechanisms such as 
redefining the self as an addict or justifying the lapse, also lessen its 
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intensity? Marla~ does not fully explain its instability, or clarify the 
relationship between the various mechanisms involved that impact on its 
intensity. 
Another criticism concerns the relationship between the problem of 
immediate gratification and relapse or a lapse. Why does a person who is 
committed to abstinence focus only on the immediate consequences and 
"forget" or ignore what he/she has experienced in the past? Why does the 
PIG exercise such influence and what are the mechanisms underlying this 
cognitive distortion? Marlatt appeals to conditioning theory to account for 
the presence of urges and cravings. However this does not explain the 
apparent capacity of some addicted individuals to discount their prior 
knowledge and experience. 
RELAPSE PREVENTION AND THE TREATMENT OF SEX 
OFFENDERS 
As noted earlier, the RP model has been extended to the treatment of 
sex offenders by a number of clinicians and researchers (Marques et al., 
1989; Pithers, 1990). A recent review of RP programmes with sex offenders 
has commented favourably on their efficacy (Marshall et al., 1991). Three 
programmes in particular stand out as impressive examples of the 
application of RP treatment methods to sex offenders. All of these 
programmes included different types of sex offenders, although it seems 
that Marshall has the least restrictive criteria (Marshall et al., 1991). 
Marshall and his colleagues in Canada have developed a cognitive-
behavioural treatment programme for sex offenders that includes a relapse 
prevention component (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990a). Their initial outcome 
data suggests a reduction in the reoffending rate of almost two thirds, 
down from approximately 42% (in some offence categories) to 13% 
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(Marshall & Barbaree, 1990a). The time at risk for their sample is up to ten 
years. 
The programme based at the Atascadero State Hospital has been 
described by Marques et al., (1989). Out of 47 men with an average of 12.7 
months at risk, only 8% had reoffended at follow-up compared to 20% of 
untreated volunteers (n = 49) and 21 % of non-volunteers (n = 42). 
However, encouraging as this data is, it is important to note that the actual 
time at risk is still insufficient to provide an adequate test of the model. 
The other major RP programme is operated by Vermont State 
Corrections and has been systematically evaluated (Pithers, Martin & 
Cumming, 1989). Of the 147 child sex offenders to graduate from this 
programme, only 3% have reoffended (pithers & Cumming, 1989). It is not 
clear what the time at risk is for this group of offenders, although it appears 
to span at least six years. 
In adapting the RP approach to sex offenders, a number of changes 
have had to be made to the model. The presence of a victim has required 
the redefinition of a lapse and relapse to points further back in the 
behaviour chain. Here a lapse is defined as the occurrence of deviant 
sexual fantasies that is said to be the first predictable sign of losing control 
(Pithers, 1990), while a relapse is seen as the occurrence of an actual offence. 
Another major recent change has been the addition to the RP model of 
the external supervision dimension (pithers, 1990). The traditional RP 
model with its emphasis on the acquisition of self-management skills has 
been relabelled the internal management dimension. The external 
supervision dimension is a component added to the RP model for post-
treatment follow-up, and is particularly designed for incarcerated offenders 
who leave prison under jurisdictional control, for example, on probation. It 
involves enhancing the efficacy of supervision by identifying specific 
offence precursors and creating an informed network of collateral contacts 
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to assist both the offender and the probation officer. This serves to create a 
collaborative relationship between those responsible for the offender's 
supervision and the mental health professionals treating the offender, the 
offender himself, and his social network. 
As argued above, concerning the general model, the RP model that 
has been applied to the treatment of sex offenders depends upon the 
concept of the relapse process and its various components. It is important 
when assessing its adequacy to critically evaluate its theoretical 
components. There is a clear conceptual relationship between RP treatment 
strategies and the hypothetical underlying relapse process, indeed this is a 
major strength of this approach to therapy. 
I will critically examine Pithers (Pithers, Cumming, Beal, Young, & 
Turner, 1989; Pithers & Cumming, 1989; Pithers, Martin, & Cumming, 1989; 
Pithers, Marques, Gibot, & Marlatt, 1983) models of the relapse process 
because of the tentative effectiveness of his treatment programme and the 
major influence his work on relapse has had in the area. Arguably, it is the 
best formulated, articulated and most influential model of the relapse 
process in the sex offender area. 
PITHERS MODELS OF THE RELAPSE PROCESS 
Pithers (1990) argues that sexually aggressive acts share affective, 
cognitive and behavioural components associated with relapse in the 
addiction area. He questions the assumption that sexual aggression is an 
impulsive act and emphasises the importance of planning in the majority of 
sexual assaults. He notes that offenders appear to carefully plan their 
offences to create the appearance of impulsiveness, and argues that 
therefore models of the relapse process need to reflect this fact (Pithers, 
1990). 
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Pithers has actually formulated two distinct although related models 
of the relapse process (see figures 4 and 5). One of these covers (figure 4) 
the whole relapse process and is clearly related to Marlatt's model of 
relapse. While the other (from HRSs to relapse, see figure 5), originated 
from his work into the antecedents of sexual offending. He frequently 
discusses both in his many book chapters on RP but does not clearly 
integrate them, particularly in relapse prevention terms. I will discuss each 
in turn. 
In his first model of the relapse process, Pithers emphasises the role 
that AIDs play in setting up HRSs (figure 4). He defines HRS in terms 
identical to Marlatt, where a person's sense of control over their prohibited 
behaviour is threatened. The major HRSs are those involving negative 
emotional states, interpersonal conflict, and external situations such as 
baby-sitting. Thus initially the offender is in an abstinent state with 
consequent high levels of self-efficacy concerning control over his deviant 
sexual behaviour. However AIDs function to set up HRSs which if not 
coped with effectively result in a lapse, for example, a sexual fantasy. An 
example of an apparently irrelevant decision is the decision to spend the 
summer vacation in a national park where children are likely to be present. 
Being in the park around children constitutes the HRS and the failure to 
cope effectively with this problem can lead to a lapse, for example, sexual 
fantasies about children. 
The AVE influences whether or not a lapse becomes a relapse. Pithers 
relies on Marlatt's earlier formulation of the AVE and hypothesises that 
there is conflict between a sex offenders self-image as reformed and the 
recent experience of a lapse, for example, a deviant sexual fantasy. This 
dissonance effect is a major component of the AVE and may be resolved by 
the offender deciding that despite his treatment, he is still a sex offender. 
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How it is resolved determines the strength of the AVE. The second major 
component of the AVE is an attribution as to the cause of the lapse. If the 
offender identifies a factor such as a lack of willpower or weak personality 
as the cause, there is little reason to expand energy and he is therefore more 
likely to relapse and offend sexually. Pithers argues that the intensity of the 
AVE (and therefore its effect on the probability of relapse) is further 
increased if the offender focuses selectively on the positive consequences of 
sexual assault and ignores the negative. This is the problem of immediate 
gratification (PIG). If the offender fails to deal effectively with the AVE, 
relapse is highly probable. 
In his second model (see figure 5), Pithers hypothesises that an 
offender who is currently in control of his sexual offending, experiences a 
negative affective change, for example, feeling depressed, anxious or lonely, 
and is unable to cope effectively with these feelings. This leads to fantasies 
of performing sexually aggressive acts. These fantasies are then converted 
into distorted thoughts concerning the (fantasised) victim. These include 
rationalisation, justifying possible future assaults and attributing 
inappropriate characteristics to the victim, for example, attributing adult 
characteristics to a child. Next the offender refines plans that enable the 
fantasies to be enacted, usually during masturbation, the pairing with 
orgasm effectively enhancing its valence This plan may also contain 
aspects that minimise the offender's degree of responsibility. Finally the 
plan is carried out and the offender relapses, that is, a sexual assault occurs. 
PROBLEMS WIlli PIlliERS MODELS OF THE RELAPSE PROCESS 
There are a number of problems with Pithers RP model. A general point is 
that Pithers has two models of the relapse process, one covering the whole 
relapse process and the other from HRSs to relapse. The major problem is 
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that they are not well integrated. In the second model, Pithers further 
divides the lapse into a number of components, that is fantasy, cognitive 
distortions, and planning, without specifying that he is doing this. An 
additional difficulty is that the second model is not an RP model at all, at 
least in Marlatt's sense. Pithers does not clearly label the related processes 
in RP terms and in fact some seem to be completely missing, for example, 
the AVE. 
Therefore I will concentrate further critical remarks on his first model 
of the relapse process as it is similar to the RP model formulated by Marlatt 
(1985b). Pithers is vulnerable to many of the criticisms directed at Marlatt's 
model because he relies so heavily on it. I will briefly summarise these 
cri ticisms. 
A generic point is that Pithers, like Marlatt, postulates the existence of 
a number of mechanisms associated with the relapse process that appear to 
either conflict with each other, or are not clearly related. Additionally, 
Pithers does not convincingly address the interactions between the major 
constructs such as HRSs, lapses, AIDs, and so on. An offender frequently 
experiences a number of lapses before ultimately relapsing (George & 
Marlatt, 1989; Hall, 1989). He also runs the risk of evoking unconscious 
decision making (by the way of AIDs) without accounting for the 
mechanisms involved. Finally, Pithers over emphasises the role of skill 
deficits in relapse (Rohsenow et al., 1991). 
There are also a number of problems specific to Pithers RP model that 
need to be addressed. 
Pithers reliance on Marlatt's earlier version of the A VE is a weakness 
of his model. It is (logically and empirically) possible that the mechanisms 
comprising this version of the A VE, cognitive dissonance and the 
formulation of attributions, may operate independently. The former is a 
motivational drive mechanism where negative affect created by dissonance 
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"drives" individuals to reduce it by redefining their self-image. While the 
latter involves the perception of uncontrollability and therefore the 
expectation that any future attempt at coping is futile. 
Pithers assertion that the PIG operates after the lapse, as part of the 
AVE, is somewhat confusing. This claim contrasts markedly to Marlatt's 
view that the PIG functions to mediate the transition from a HRS to a lapse. 
In Pithers model the PIG appears to undermine the AVE; there is a clash of 
mechanisms. This construct involves positive affect and facilitates the 
transition to a lapse because of its focus on the immediate pleasurable 
consequences of lapsing. While the A VE involves negative affect and leads 
to relapse because of the impact of this factor on expectations and coping 
skills. It appears that the changes made in the RP model for sex offenders 
have created this problem. The -movement of the lapse point further back in 
the behaviour chain (in Pithers model) means that the PIG now becomes 
part of the A VE. Therefore instead of the PIG facilitating the transition 
from a HRS to a lapse as it does with other disorders, for sex offenders it 
operates as part of the lapse-relapse transition. This change in the model 
raises some difficult questions regarding the relationship between the AVE 
and the PIG. 
Pithers confuses his discussion of HRSs by including negative affect as 
an example of a HRS without further clarification. Negative emotional 
states and interpersonal conflict are related to HRS in two ways. Such 
states could constitute HRSs on their own and if individuals fail to cope this 
could lead to relapse. Perhaps because offenders rely on old coping 
strategies, such as sexual fantasies and so on. Secondly, such states may 
lead to HRSs by the way of AIDs. In this pathway, negative affect is a risk 
factor possibly related to lifestyle imbalance. If a person habitually copes 
with sadness and anxiety by fantasising about having sex with children, 
then he/she may enter a HRS through AIDs to create this possibility. 
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Pithers fails to acknowledge that factors such as negative affect and 
interpersonal conflict can lead to HRSs by different pathways. This implies 
that AIDs are only likely to be involved in setting up some types of HRSs. 
In contrast to Marlatt's model, Pithers (see figure 4) has only one 
pathway to HRSs. This is unnecessarily restrictive and fails to 
accommodate the research evidence concerning relapse (Marlatt & Gordon, 
1985). It lacks the additional direct links from lifestyle imbalance and 
unexpected situations to HRSs. Perhaps this issue reflects Pithers over-
emphasis on the role of planning (AIDs) in relapse or reoffending. 
Consistent with all RP approaches, Pithers draws a distinction 
between a lapse and relapse. However, he does not draw a further 
distinction between the first instance of a sexual offence, and a return to 
. pre-treatment levels of offending or increased severity of offending. On the 
face of it this appears inconsistent with the RP approach and in fact serves 
to under-cut the RP model. Surely there is an important difference between 
committing one offence and committing many, or increasing the severity of 
offending during a single assault. An offender treated according to Pithers 
model may experience a very strong A VE after the first offence and 
therefore is likely to continue (or exacerbate) his sexually aggressive 
behaviour. Perhaps we need to make a further distinction based on the 
severity or frequency of offending. For example, a single instance of 
sexually aggressive behaviour could be labelled Relapse One, and multiple 
offences or increased severity, could be labelled Relapse Two (Hudson & 
Ward, 1992). Arguably, the social costs of the latter are greater than the 
former. It is a sensible and ethically appropriate strategy to continue to 
apply RP principles following the first sexual offence. Of course in therapy 
it is important to teach offenders to regard relapse as something to avoid. 
It is important to distinguish between HRSs that refer to situations 
and those that refer to non-volitional states. Clearly AIDs can only directly 
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function to covertly set up some situations and internal states more 
indirectly, if at all. If a lapse is a sexual fantasy, what is the HRS from 
which it emerged? If a person is baby-sitting (clearly a HRS), then it makes 
sense to view the lapse more behaviourally, that is, as either approaching or 
suggesting something to a child rather than in terms of sexual fantasies. 
One possibility is to introduce the idea of a hierarchy of lapses with the 
more covert and distal factors having less immediate impact on relapse. 
Therefore, sexual fantasies would be less (temporally) directly related to 
sexual assault than, for example, an offender asking a child to sit on his 
knee. 
There are a number of difficulties in both Marlatt's and Pithers models 
of the relapse process that arguably undermine the coherency of the AVE 
construct and the theory in which it is embedded. However, for the 
purposes of this study, the construct of the Abstinence Violation Effect is of 
crucial importance. In the next chapter I will critically evaluate Marlatt's 
reformulated AVE (the most recent version of the AVE) and then offer a 
reformulation in purely attributional terms that I believe avoids the above 
criticisms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE ABSTINENCE VIOLATION EFFECT - A REFORMULATION 
The AVE is a cognitive/affective reaction to an initial violation 
of an abstinence rule, forbidding or restricting a particular behaviour 
(George & Marlatt 1989; Marlatt, 1985a, 1985b). This reaction is an 
important mediator of the relapse process and as such in part 
determines whether a lapse becomes a full-blown relapse. To briefly 
summarise, the AVE has two major components, an attribution as to 
the cause of the lapse and the affective reaction to this attribution. 
How individuals view the initial lapse determines in part whether 
they resume adherence to their abstinence rules. Marlatt argues that 
the intensity of the AVE will be greater if an attribution is made to 
factors that are stable, internal and global and perceived to be 
uncontrollable. The AVE is an dimensional construct and the more 
intense the A VE is, the greater the probability of relapse. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
There has been no published empirical research into the A VE in 
the area of sexual aggression although a small amount of research has 
been done in other areas with addictions. I will critically review this 
literature and following a critique of Marlatt's recent version of the 
AVE, present a reformulation of this construct and discuss its 
advantages. 
It is possible to divide the existing research into two groups 
based on its overall strategy, (a) studies where the existence of the 
A VE is either not the primary focus of the research, or else it is 
indirectly inferred, and (b) research that attempts to directly measure 
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the components of the AVE and thereby establish its existence. The 
former line of research provides less satisfactory evidence for the 
AVE and I will review this first. 
There has been some interesting research into the cognitive 
mediators of dieting and compulsive eating (Heatherington & 
Baumeister, 1991; Jansen, Merckelback, Osteerlaan, Tuiten, & 
Vanderhout, 1988; Polivy & Herman, 1991; Ruderman, 1985). There 
is some evidence that restrained eaters overeat after the disruption of 
self-control of caloric intake (Ogden & Wardle, 1991; Ruderman, 
1986). This process is mediated by cognitive mechanisms similar to 
the AVE, however, the literature describing this research has tended 
to focus on constructs like restraint and counter-regulation (Polivy & 
Herman, 1991; Jansenet aL,1988). The researchers have not tended to 
explicitly test for the AVE, although some (Ogden & Wardle, 1990) 
have done so implicitly (see below). 
Barrios and Niehaus (1985) investigated the role of self-efficacy 
and the AVE (Marlatt's first version) in precipitating relapse in 
smokers. They used an established self-efficacy based questionnaire to 
determine whether sex of the subject and duration of smoking history 
affected self-efficacy, and whether relapse episodes were associated 
with negative moods. They hypothesised that smoking precipitated 
by negative affect should lower self-efficacy and increase the chances 
of relapse and that successful quitters should report higher self-
efficacy than unsuccessful quitters. The results supported these 
hypotheses. Although their study did not include a measure of the 
A VE, Barrios and Niehaus argued that their results provided 
evidence for this effect. This conclusion was based on the 
hypothetical relationship between negative mood states, low self-
efficacy expectations and relapse. 
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An obvious weakness of this study is the failure to 
measure the components of the AVE. The reliance on Marlatt's 
earlier formulation of the AVE is also a problem. 
Kirkley and Fisher (1988) examined the validity of the RP model 
of relapse in diabetics. Insulin dependent and non-insulin dependent 
diabetics were interviewed regarding their most recent dietary 
violations and the results coded according to the type of HRSs 
involved. In addition, the subjects were asked to describe the main 
reason for violating the diet, any thoughts or feelings that precipitated 
the lapse, feelings about the violations and whether the violation was 
followed by a relapse. They concluded that there was no evidence of 
the AVE in this patient population. The majority of both subject 
groups reported no negative emotional reactions to their dietary 
violation. Of those who did experience negative affect following a 
lapse, only a minority continued to stay off their diets. The majority 
of the sample were, however, under continued poor metabolic 
control. Interestingly, a number of subjects (17%) reported lapsing 
under the influence of a positive mood state. 
A weakness in this study is the lack of specific attributional and 
affect measures. Therefore the authors are not able to identify the 
hypothesised changes in the attributional dimensions that accompany 
the AVE. Another problem is the lack of commitment of the subjects 
to their treatment regime. Therefore, it is not surprising that a lapse 
failed to lead to the AVE. 
Schlundt et al., (1989), examined the eating behaviour of obese 
women by conducting a microanalysis of their eating diaries, which 
included a record of HRSs. They also asked subjects to check a list of 
eighteen adjectives describing positive and negative physical and 
emotional feelings at the time of the eating episode. In addition, 
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subjects made judgements describing their behaviour and perceptions 
at each episode. These included rating their degree of craving, urge to 
over-eat, presence of forbidden foods, degree of impulsivity and 
whether they felt they had eaten too much. Their results suggested 
that eating behaviour is partially controlled by environmental, 
cognitive and affective variables as opposed to only biological 
variables. The positive relationship between over-eating, loss of 
control and degree of impulsivity was thought to suggest the AVE. 
A good feature of this study is the attempt to specifically assess 
emotions during eating episodes. The naturalistic design is also a 
comendable aspect. However, a major difficulty is the failure to 
specifically measure attributional dimensions. 
Haaga (1989) used the -RP framework to evaluate claims that the 
Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS) paradigm 
is more valid than endorsement methods of cognitive assessment. A 
major subsidiary hypothesis was that low self-efficacy expectations 
and a high AVE should predict relapse. He used the Curry et al., 
(1987) definition of the AVE where measurement of the attributional 
(dimensions of internality, stability, globality) and the affective (guilt) 
components is by seven point scales. He assessed the cognitions of 
abstinent smokers shortly after lapsing and found that a high AVE 
failed to discriminate lapsers from recoverers. 
Although Haaga's design allowed for the measurement of guilt 
(within the ATSS procedure) he failed to assess affect in a 
comprehensive manner. In addition by using the Curry et al., (1987) 
definition of the AVE, he does not adequately assess the attributional 
dimension of controllability (see below); arguably a core component 
of the AVE. 
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Kales (1990), examined attributions towards food groups among 
bulimic individuals and the reported contents (safe versus forbidden 
foods) of both binge and non-binge eating episodes. Subjects recorded 
total daily food intake for a week before arriving at the testing 
sessions and listed five foods, rated in order of intensity, in each of 
two food categories labelled "safe" and "forbidden". The Foods 
Attribution Rating Scale provided pretest information about subject's 
beliefs regarding specific foods. The results showed a strong 
association between attributions and dichotomous attitudes about 
specific foods, and the content of binge and non-binge episodes. Kales 
concluded that the connection between eating forbidden foods (the 
perception of abstinence violation) and the consequent loss of control 
expressed in binge eating behaviour, suggested an AVE. However the 
study failed to specifically measure attributional dimensions and 
affect and therefore is not in a good position to provide evidence for 
the AVE. 
Bradley, Gossop, Brewin, Phillips, and Green (1992) investigated 
the reaction of opiate addicts to abstinence violations and whether 
their subsquent attributions predicted future drug use. Attributions 
were measured in two ways. First by using a measure of attributions 
of responsibility for positive and negative outcomes and secondly, 
specific attributions concerning opiate use were elicited by interview 
questions. The attributions elicited by interview were subsequently 
rated by an independent researcher on the attributional dimensions 
of locus, stability, controllability and globality. They found that 
addicts who attributed greater responsibility for negative outcomes to 
themselves and who attributed relapse episodes to more personally 
controllable factors were more likely at six months follow up to be 
either completely abstinent or else were successfully able to prevent a 
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lapse from becoming a relapse. The only attributional dimension, 
aside from responsibility, to be positively associated with abstinence, 
was controllability. They argued that their results do not support the 
importance of the attributional dimensions of stability or globality 
and therefore do not support the AVE construct. 
A problem in this study is the failure to measure attributions at 
the time of the lapse rather than retrospectively. In addition, the 
researchers coded the subjects' interview attributions into the 
relevant dimensions as opposed to using a direct rating method. 
According to Benson (1989) and Russell (1982), this is a less valid way 
of assessing attributional dimensions. Another problem is the failure 
to measure affect at alL 
The above studies, although frequently supportive, failed to 
specifically target the cognitive and the affective components of the 
AVE. Five recent studies have focused more specifically on the AVE 
and as such deserve closer attention. 
Curry, Marlatt, & Gordon, (1987) provided evidence for the 
attributional component of the AVE in smokers. The measurement 
of the AVE (see below) consisted of obtaining an average of three 
attributional dimensions. Attributions for responsibility following 
initial lapses were assessed both prospectively and retrospectively. 
Subjects were presented, in the former condition, with six 
hypothetical situations in which people might be tempted to smoke, 
and asked to imagine themselves in each situation. They were asked 
to fill out the scales twice, once for each of two outcomes, abstinence 
and smoking. They identified a cause for the outcome and filled out 
attribution rating scales traversing the attributional dimensions of 
locus, stability and globality. In the latter treatment condition, 
subjects who had lapsed also supplied retrospective causal 
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attributions for initial smoking episodes using the same rating scales. 
Guilt and stress were measured on 7 point rating scales. Their results 
indicated that participants who relapsed following a slip reported a 
significantly larger AVE, than those who resumed compliance with 
their abstinence rules. Interestingly, the AVE score emerged as the 
strongest predictor of later smoking. 
A problem with this research project is the failure to measure 
affect adequately; only guilt and stress were assessed. In addition, one 
of the attributional measures (the prospective measure using 
hypothetical situations), confounds attributional style with post-event 
specific attributions. The important outcomes as far as the AVE is 
concerned are not those described in the hypothetical situations, but 
rather, situations specific to"the individuals concerned. In the 
condition containing the hypothetical HRSs, the individual smokers 
were asked to make attributions concerning situations they may have 
never experienced, rather than about their own lapses or possible 
lapses. 
Another problem is their failure to directly measure the 
controllability dimension or to include it in their definition of the 
AVE (higher scores on the attributional dimensions of locus, globality 
and stability). Although Marlatt did not include controllability as part 
of the attributional component of the A VE, he does stress its 
importance in intensifying negative affect. 
Birke et al., (1990) investigated the impact of the AVE on relapse 
in illicit drug users. Subjects were interviewed in their own homes 
and completed a semistructured interview and an attributional 
measure. The attributional style of abstainers and relapsers were 
examined besides the HRS precipitating resumed drug use. They 
used Marlatt's earlier version of the AVE (Marlatt & Gordon, 1980) in 
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which both cognitive dissonance and attributions combine to produce 
the AYE. The AVE was measured (see below) by modifying the 
Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson, Semmel, von Baeyer, 
Abramson, Metalsky, & Seligman, 1982). Their results did not 
support the existence of the AVE and they argued that perhaps it was 
not as relevant for illicit drug users as for users of other addictive 
substances. 
A major difficulty with this study is the measurement of 
attributional style rather than post-event specific attributions. In 
Marlatt's model of the AVE it is the person's attribution for a specific 
outcome or behaviour that is important rather than attributional 
style. This represents a different level of analysis and arguably 
undermines their conclusions concerning the A VE. They do not 
measure affect or emotion at all or assess the attributional dimension 
of controllability. 
Ogden and Wardle (1990) examined the relationship between 
attributional style and dietary compliance in restrained eaters. They 
also examined whether attributions mediated the transition from a 
lapse to a relapse. Although they did not explicitly mention the AVE, 
it is clear from their discussion of Marlatt's RP model and the 
perceived relationship between a lapse and attributions, that they 
were referring to this process. Their results indicated that while an 
internal attributional style for negative events was associated with 
more diet breaking episodes, attributions did not differentially predict 
a lapse versus a relapse. The results also suggested that neither the 
internality nor stability attributional dimensions successfully 
predicted a relapse. Their results did not support the AVE. 
There are a number of problems with this study. First, Ogden 
and Wardle (1990) do not explicitly label the AVE when it appears 
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obvious that they are using this construct. They also mistakenly 
conceptualise the cognitive component of the AVE in terms of 
attributional style rather than post-event specific attributions. 
Additionally, there is no attempt to measure affect at all and therefore 
their (implicit ) conclusions concerning the A VE are not valid. 
In an important study Collins and Lapp (1991) investigated the 
AVE in social drinkers. In a cross-sectional test of the AVE a 
community sample of social drinkers completed measures of 
perceived efficacy for controlling alcohol consumption and causal 
attributions for drinking related events. They developed the 
Drinking Attributional Style Questionnaire to assess attributional 
style for drinking related events. They addressed the role of emotion 
in the A VE(see below) by including a measure of negative affect, the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). One of their major hypotheses was 
that if the AVE occurs among social drinkers, then attributional style 
and measures of alcohol restraint (control) should predict alcohol 
problems and greater consumption. 
They concluded that the tendency to attribute causes of drinking 
related events to internal, stable and global characteristics, in 
association with elevated BD! scores, predicted higher levels of 
alcohol consumption and related problems. This was thought to 
provide some evidence for the AVE. 
An impressive feature of Collins and Lapp's study is their 
acknowledgment of the importance of the affective component of the 
A VE, although unfortunately the BD! is not a measure of emotion or 
affect (see below). A problem with their method is the use of 
attributional style as a measure although they do focus on specific 
drinking related events. They also fail to include an adequate 
measure of the controllability dimension. 
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Finally, Schoeneman, Hollis, Stevens, Fischer, and Cheek (1988) 
compared smokers who had relapsed after a period of abstinence with 
those who had lapsed but returned to abstinence. In a retrospective 
study they telephoned subjects one to two years after they had completed 
a smoking cessation programme and assessed their attributions, 
emotions and expectations following their first lapse. They were 
particularly interested in whether or not the two groups were 
discriminable in terms of characterological versus behavioural self-
blame, as the former was thought to be an important part of the A VE. In 
terms of their hypotheses Schoeneman et al., expected that relapsed 
subjects would show a more intense AVE with greater endorsement of 
characterological causes, while those who returned to abstinence would 
engage more in behavioural self-blame. They used a modified 
attributional style test and a shortened version of Russell's (1982) Causal 
Dimension Scale to measure attributions and attributional dimensions 
retrospectively. Emotions were assess by using 16 five point scales, one 
for each of sixteen emotions. The results indicated that while relapsers 
were more likely to ascribe lapses to characterological causes, there was 
no difference between the two groups on the attributional dimensions 
or emotion scales. These results did not provide clear support for the 
AVE. 
A commendable feature of this study is the attempt to 
comprehensively measure emotions and post-event specific 
attributions. However the measures used to assess both are inadequate. 
They do not use an established and psychometrically valid measure of 
emotion, and in addition the shortening of the CDS may have reduced 
its reliability. Another difficulty is the retrospective nature of the 
design. The failure to discriminate between lapsers and relapsers may be 
due to the lack of emotional immediacy of the lapse, given the 
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retrospective nature of the study, as well as the inadequacy of the 
measures used. 
The research evidence for the AVE at this stage is a mixture of 
supportive and unsupportive studies. The major problem is that the 
majority of the research is guided by a flawed A VE construct (see 
below) and therefore, because of this, undermined by inadequate 
measurement strategies. It would be a valuable extension of the 
research into the A VE to focus more on the dimension of 
controllability and assess a wider range of emotions (Lazarus, 1991a). 
Concerning the tendency of most researchers to measure 
attributional style rather than post-event specific attributions, this is 
an empirical question. It does raise the important issue whether or 
not stylistiC or trait cognitive variables are more important than 
specific state ones in causing relapse and its associated processes. 
DEFINING THE A VE CONSTRUCT 
It is obvious from the above literature review that much of the 
previous research into the A VE has been flawed by inadequate 
measurement strategies. To test the AVE hypothesis it is necessary to 
measure both emotions and attributional dimensions. I will now 
critically examine the way some of the more important studies 
reviewed above, have operationally defined the AVE. 
Haaga, (1989) and Curry et al., (1987), conceptualise the AVE as a 
combination of internal-external, stable-unstable and global-specific 
attributional dimensions and by obtaining an average (in these 
studies, the higher the score, the greater the AVE) arrived at a single 
A VE score. A problem in their approach is the failure to include the 
attributional dimension of controllability. However, they are simply 
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following Marlatt's model of the AVE in this respect (Marlatt, 1985b). 
Although Marlatt does discuss the important role of the perception of 
uncontrollability in creating the A VE, he does not explicitly include it 
as part of the attributional component. An additional difficulty is 
their failure to assess emotion or affect in a comprehensive way. A 
positive feature of the definition of the AVE used in these studies, is 
the combining of the attributional dimensions. Marlatt views the 
A VE as a composite construct and the above measurement strategies 
reflect this fact. The difficulties with Marlatt's formulation of the 
A VE are discussed in the next section. 
Collins and Lapp (1991) developed the Drinking Attributional 
Style uestionnaire to assess explanatory style as applied to drinking 
related events. They modelled this measure on the Attributional 
Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982) used extensively in work on 
the attributional underpinning's of depression (Abramson et al., 
1989). As noted earlier, they measured affect using the Beck 
Depression Inventory and a difficulty here is that the BDI is not a 
measure of emotion or affect, but rather, a measure of depression. 
Collins and Lapp used a composite score of causal attributions for 
positive and negative situations to define the attributional 
component of the AVE, and found that the tendency to attribute 
causes of drinking related events to internal, stable and global 
characteristics contributed to a higher maximum number of drinks 
and greater number of alcohol related problems. As discussed above, 
the use of an attributional style measure is a problem with this study. 
Birke et al.,(1990) used the attributional style questionnaire to 
assess locus, stability and globality of attributions as a way of 
measuring the Abstinence Violation Effect in illicit drug users. They 
compared abstainers and relapsers on the three attributional 
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dimensions and this constituted their measure of the A VE. The 
failure to include emotion and the confounding of attributional style 
with post event specific attributions are problems in this study. 
Ogden and Wardle (1990) defined the AVE in terms of locus but 
also compared relapsers and abstainers on the dimensions of globality 
and stability. They measured attributions using the Life Evaluation 
and Attributions Rating Scale (LEAR) which is an attributional style 
measure. 
There are problems with the way these studies have 
operationally defined the A VE. They have either neglected to 
adequately measure emotion or have not combined the attributional 
dimensions in a way that reflects Marlatt's definition of the AVE as a 
composite construct. I will describe the definition used in this thesis 
in chapter four. 
PROBLEMS WITH MARLA TrS VERSION OF mE AVE 
Marlatt uses a variety of conceptual sources in his formulation 
of the AVE. I argue that the integration of such diverse theories has 
made his analysis somewhat cumbersome and has lead to 
inadequacies. This has resulted in a narrowing of the range of 
application of the AVE (and related attributional processes) and in the 
failure to accommodate the full number of attributional pathways to 
relapse or sexual offending. Because of this Marlatt failed to include 
in his model of the relapse process a number of important 
behavioural possibilities that are relevant to the conceptualisation of 
relapse, and clinical intervention. 
The essence of the problem with the A VE as currently 
conceptualised is the reliance on Weiner's earlier work (1972) which 
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means that causes are defined on an a priori basis (e.g., luck, effort, 
ability). The use of this older version is important for two reasons. 
The relative narrowness of this view of attribution has meant Marlatt 
needed to broaden the theoretical base to include constructs such as 
objective self-awareness to account for the AVE phenomena. This 
has lead to an unfortunate degree of cumbersomeness. 
Secondly, this reliance on Weiner's (1972) version leads to a 
narrower view of the possibilities involved in the relapse processes 
(AVE) than is currently desirable. Both of these problems .are 
avoidable by using the more recent and broader attributional theory 
proposed by Weiner in 1986. However, before presenting this 
reformulation I would like to detail the difficulties in the current 
AVE construct. 
The use of Weiner's (1972) earlier theory ignores that 
attributions represent naive causal explanations and are therefore best 
construed as lying along dimensions such as locus, stability and 
controllability (Weiner 1986) rather than representing categorical 
choices between discrete alternative explanations. An illustration of 
Marlatt's confusion between type of causes and causal dimensions is 
his translation of Weiner's earlier "basic causes" such as ability (a 
stable internal factor) to coping skills (unstable internal factor). This 
is not necessary if a person is rating an attribution directly onto 
attributional dimensions. 
Marlatt also fails to distinguish between different kinds of affect 
or emotions and their possible differential impact on behaviour. In 
his recent revision of attributional theory, Weiner (1986) explicitly 
argues that different emotions occur as a consequence of different 
causal inferences (via dimensional loading). These emotions in turn 
have different effects on behaviour because of their different 
information value. 
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The examples of shame and guilt illustrate the relationship 
between causal dimensions and emotions. Shame arises when the 
cause of some negative event is attributed to internal, uncontrollable 
factors such as a lack of ability, whereas guilt arises from attributions 
to internal but controllable factors such as a lack of effort. As a 
consequence, these two emotions may have quite different 
motivational consequences, both at the time these emotions arise and 
in terms of avoiding future risks. For example, if an alcohol 
dependent individual committed to abstinence, blames himself for 
not having made a big enough effort to avoid a recent lapse, then the 
consequent guilt may prompt him to escape from the HRS and 
thereby avoid relapse. On the other hand, if he attributes the cause to 
his "deficient personality" (a stable, internal and uncontrollable 
cause), he will feel ashamed,and see further effort as hopeless. This 
would most likely lead to relapse. Marlatt, however, speaks of these 
emotions as if they are equivalent. 
In terms of theoretical simplicity (Hooker, 1987) Marlatt's . 
reliance on a diverse range of theories has resulted in confusion 
where different, often conflicting mechanisms are said to be causally 
linked to the A VE. For example, a discrepancy between ideal and 
actual behaviour leads to negative affect independently of an 
attribution. Therefore there are two types of negative affect generated 
by quite different mechanisms. Secondly, attributions concerning the 
cause of the lapse are understood to drive ongoing addictive 
behaviour either by negative affect (a drivel energy pathway) or as a 
consequence of low self-efficacy expectations (a cognitive pathway) or 
possibly by both. Weiner's (1986) recent formulation of attribution 
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theory does not have this limitation and can be used to reformulate 
the AVE. 
Marlatt's claim that the emotional impact following violation of 
abstinence rules is greater when ascribed to internal rather than 
external factors is mistaken. It is not a question of being greater but 
rather different; different affective or emotional consequences follow 
from different attributional dimensions. 
Finally, Marlatt's formulation of the A VB and associated relapse 
process is not able to accommodate the full range of 
attribution/relapse links that are implied by current theorising and 
which have different treatment implications. The A VB probably only 
represents a few of the possible relationships between attributions and 
lapse or relapse. 
These short-comings do not diminish the heuristic value of the 
A VB construct. However, I argue that it needs to be reformulated 
within purely attributional terms to avoid the above problems. 
A TIRIBUTION AND A TIRIBUTIONAL THEORIES 
Clearly attributions (and attributional dimensions) comprise a 
fundamental part of the A VB. To understand the influence that 
attributional theories have had on clinical psychology in general, and 
the sex offender field in particular, it is helpful to briefly review the 
area. 
Attribution and attributional theories have had a distinguished 
history within social psychology (Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Hewstone, 
1989; Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989). One of the major 
consequences of the cognitive revolution in psychology has been an 
increased interest in attribution and attributional theories, 
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particularly within social cognition (Sherman, Judd, & Park, 1989), 
interpersonal psychology (Anderson & Riger, 1991) and clinical 
psychology (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990; Brewin, 1988; Jack & 
Williams, 1991; Westen, 1991). 
Causal attributions are defined as inferences concerning why 
events occur and involve the explanation of interpersonal situations, 
natural events and individual characteristics (Weary et al., 1989). 
Causal attributions help people to obtain their goals and in situations 
of uncertainty, facilitate successful adaptation and mastery of the 
environment, that is, they enable people to understand, predict and 
control the world. A distinction is frequently drawn between 
attribution theory, the study of the antecedents and the formation of 
attributions, and attributional theory, the study of the consequences of 
attributions and their impact on behaviour, emotion and cognition 
(Hewstone, 1989; Weary et al., 1989; Weiner, 1986). 
Heider (1958, 1944) founded the area of attribution research and 
theory. His seminal book, The Psychology of Inter-personal Relations 
(1958), focuses on the way people explain the actions of others. His 
approach is phenomenological and concentrates on the reasons 
people give for other's actions, rather than on underlying 
unconscious causes. He also explicitly endorses the metaphor of 
people as lay scientists engaged in constructing theories about the 
world in order to understand and adapt (Weary et al., 1989). Jones 
and Davis (1965), other important early attribution theorists, 
contributed significantly to research with their model of 
correspondent inferences. This theory is essentially concerned with 
the factors that influence a person's attributions of intentions and 
dispositions to other people. Kelly (1972, 1967) and Bem (1972) 
extended attribution theory to self-perception. Kelly (1967) further 
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developed the person as scientist metaphor and believed that when 
people make causal attributions they are functioning very much like 
naive statisticians undertaking an analysis of variance. He also 
introduced the concept of causal schemata (1972) to account for 
situations where individuals rely on experience when forming causal 
explanations rather than engaging in systematic data analysis. In 
these situations they do not have access to multiple instances of an 
event. It is arguable that this theoretical development opened the 
door for the introduction of unconscious or automatic attributional 
processes (Lazarus, 1991b). 
Contemporary research in attribution and attributional areas has 
moved well beyond social psychology (Hayes & Hesketh, 1989). It is 
now in the process of providing the social-cognitive underpinning of 
cognitive-behavioural therapy (Bradbury & Fincham, 1990; Fosterling, 
1986; Hilton, 1990; Iacobucci & McGill, 1991; Kenardy, Evans, & Oei, 
1990; Weiner, 1986). 
WEINER'S A TTRIBUTIONAL THEORY 
Weiner's (1972) theory provides the attributional 
underpinning's to Marlatt's latest model of the AVE, however as 
noted above, there are problems with both of these. His recent work 
(Weiner, 1986) can be used to reformulate the AVE in a way that 
avoids these criticisms and increases its range of application. 
This recent attributional theory (Weiner, 1986) is a significant 
contribution to the motivation and emotion literature and has 
recently been used in a number of criminal justice research projects 
(Larsen, 1992; Mackay-Lawes, 1992). There is convincing research 
evidence for the relationship between attributional dimensions and 
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specific emotions (Graham & Weiner 1986; Graham & Weiner, 1991; 
Kelly & Forsythe, 1984; Weiner, 1986, 1985). 
Weiner's model has been subject to criticism from other 
researchers who have challenged his claims concerning the 
appropriate number and type of attributional dimensions (Wearyet 
al., 1989). For example, Benson (1989) includes globality in a test he 
has developed to measure attributional dimensions, while others 
have singled out intentionality and universality as being of 
importance (Weary et al., 1989). However these disagreements do not 
detract from the enormous influence that Weiner's work has had in 
the social cognitive and clinical area. I will now describe his recent 
attributional theory in some detail. 
In his 1986 book, Weiner develops a theory of motivation and 
emotion that is based upon the construct of causal attributions. He 
defines a cause as an answer to a why question concerning an event 
or outcome. A cause is inferred by an individual and therefore the 
" \ " 
study of attributions involves phenomenology; attributions are naive 
causal explanations. He supports his view that all individuals engage 
in causal explanations to facilitate adaptation by citing evidence that 
people engage in spontaneous attributional activities (Weiner, 1985, 
1986) rather than attributions being an artefact of the experimental 
situation. More specifically, individuals formulate causal 
explanations following negative, unexpected or important outcomes 
(see figure 6). He cites research evidence to support the existence of at 
least three attributional dimensions. Attributions differ along the 
major dimensions of stability, locus and controllability (Weiner, 
1986). Stability refers to whether or not the identified cause is seen as 
enduring. For example attributing behaviour to a lack of ability may 
involve accepting that the cause of the behaviour is a stable, relatively 
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unalterable factor. Stability also functions as a magnifier, potentiating 
the affect determined by the remaining two dimensions, presumably 
because of the more enduring nature of the cause. 
Locus of control refers to whether the cause is seen as internal to 
the person (e.g., a disease or a personal deficit), or as externally 
imposed (e.g., the weather or the action of another person). 
Controllability concerns the person's sense that the cause was 
volitional (Le., able to be influenced by effort or action). He concedes 
that there is evidence of at least two other attributional dimensions, 
glob all specific and intentional! unintentional, but builds his theory of 
motivation and emotion around the three dimensions outlined 
above. Weiner argues that an attributional search begins with an 
outcome (see figure 6) that is" perceived to be important, unexpected, 
or negative. A number of variables affect an attributional search and 
these include a person's history, causal rules or schemata and salience 
of the outcome. He views goal expectations as an important 
determinant of behaviour, which are related to attributions. Changes 
in expectations following an outcome are influenced by the perceived 
stability of the cause. Thus a stable cause is expected to occur with 
greater certainty in the future, whereas an unstable cause may not 
alter future expectations. 
Attributions not only enable the person to understand, predict 
and control the world, they also have a differential causal impact on 
emotional reactions. The relationship between different causal 
ascription's and different emotions is essential to understanding the 
AVE and it relevance for relapse. 
Weiner argues that attributions typically precede and determine 
a person's affective reaction to an outcome. The link. between goal 
expectations, attributions and behaviour is strengthened by emotion 
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(i.e., the value of a goal relates to its emotional impact). Therefore if 
something has positive value for a person, its attainment will have 
positive emotional consequences. The perception of what caused an 
outcome will in part determine the emotional response to it. In 
Weiner's theory, cognitions of increased complexity enter into the 
emotional process and further refine and differentiate emotional 
experience (see figure 6). He distinguishes between relatively simple 
attribution independent emotions such as joy or pleasure that do not 
result from a causal search and emotions that do, which are 
definitionally cognitively more complex. This is of relevance 
regarding the AVE in that the lapse itself does not directly determine 
affect, aspects of the perceived cause do. In a sex offender committed 
to abstinence, a lapse.is seen as a negative outcome; but it is the 
attribution regarding the cause of the lapse that determines his 
emotional response. 
Weiner suggests that the nature of the causal attribution for an 
outcome is uniquely related to particular differentiated emotional 
reactions. However, the links between attributions on the one hand 
and emotions on the other are not s,traightforward. Each emotion is 
related to a particular, or a combination of, attributional dimensions. 
The future related emotions such as hope and fear typically involve 
two attributional dimensions. For example, hopelessness requires 
stable and internal attributions for failure, whereas confidence occurs 
when success is experienced and attributed to a stable internal cause. 
As stated above, there is convincing research evidence for the 
relationship between attributional dimensions and specific emotions 
(Graham & Weiner, 1991; Graham & Weiner 1986; Kelly & Forsythe, 
1984; Weiner, 1986, 1985). However, some theorists (Lazarus, 1991a, 
1991b; Lazarus & Smith, 1988), believe that an attributional approach 
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to emotions is necessarily incomplete. Lazarus (1991b) argues that 
attributions only occur as components of secondary appraisal 
processes and are not able to accommodate situations where primary 
appraisal is of paramount importance. Clearly, further research is 
necessary here. 
For ease of discussion, I will focus on the attributional dimensions of 
locus and controllability in the rest of this chapter. 
As stated above, Weiner argues that the links between 
attributions on the one hand and emotions on the other, are not 
straightforward. 
First, there exist the four possibilities defined by the two major 
dimensions that I am considering; locus and controllability. Weiner 
suggests that the causal locu's (internal vs external) influences self-
esteem such that when a negative outcome is ascribed to an internal 
cause, this reduces perceptions of self-worth. H the cause is thought to 
be external, then self-esteem is unlikely to be affected. Conversely, if a 
person attributes the cause of a positive outcome to internal factors 
their self-esteem is enhanced. Guilt is related to controllability and if 
a person perceives him/herself as having been able to control a 
negative outcome (Le., internal and controllable attribution), then 
he/she will accept personal responsibility for a failure to avoid the 
outcome; they will blame themselves and feel guilty because they 
could have controlled it. H, however, a negative outcome is seen as 
being caused by factors internal but uncontrollable (e.g., personal 
deficiencies) then shame is experienced. 
As I have already noted, differential motivational consequences 
occur with shame and guilt due to the different loading upon the 
controllability dimension. Where a person experiences guilt, they see 
themselves as having had control over the cause of the negative 
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outcome and thus can attempt to reduce the future probability of the 
event. Shame, on the other hand, which results from perceiving the 
cause of failure to be personal but uncontrollable (e.g., lack of ability), 
generates little motivation for change if there is perceived to be no 
chance of improvement. 
Secondly, an additional conceptual issue needs to be considered. 
There is a special case where the cause of the negative and salient 
outcome happening to oneself is perceived as being not only external 
but also resulting from the actions of another individual, rather than 
non-volitional aspects of the environment such as the weather. 
This causal perspective is especially important where the 
individual is seen as having control over whether or not the 
situation occurs. In this situation, the probable emotional response is 
anger directed at the other person who may be seen as blame-worthy. 
Unfortunately such a state may not only lead to a relapse but also to 
retributive action against the person seen as responsible. In Weiner's 
terms this would be seen as an external controllable cause (where 
controllable means controllable by anyone). However, in this thesis 
for ease of discussion I will refer to it as a variant of an external 
uncontrollable cause. 
To illustrate. A sexually aggressive offender who is committed 
to avoid reoffending has an argument with a woman. This results in 
him feeling angry and leads onto fantasies of performing sexually 
abusive acts, that is, a lapse occurs. If the offender is attempting to 
restrain his deviant behaviour, this will be seen as a negative and 
salient outcome and therefore a causal search will occur. In this 
particular situation, the cause of the lapse will be seen as being the 
woman with whom he has argued and she will be seen as having had 
control over the fact they argued (e.g., "she was just trying to get at 
me"). This attribution may lead to an escalation of anger and 
therefore result in a sexual attack directed towards her. 
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A REFORMULATION OF THE ABSTINENCE VIOLATION EFFECT 
Reformulating the AVE in terms of Weiner's recent version of 
attributional theory (Weiner, 1986) will, I argue, provide a clearer 
picture of the process and have more beneficial implications for 
treatment. 
As in the case of the earlier relapse formulation, when a lapse 
occurs, and is seen by the offender as negative and important, an 
attributional search occurs. The particular causal attributions made 
reflect the different emotiorial and motivational possibilities 
mentioned above and these are summarised in table l. 
If the cause is seen as internal and controllable (e.g., a lack of 
personal effort) the offender may be expected to feel guilty and 
experience lowered self-esteem, yet he is like I y to remain hopeful and 
continue to adhere to his goal of abstinence. If, on the other hand, the 
cause of the lapse is perceived as internal and uncontrollable (e.g., the 
result of a lack of willpower or "addictive" personality) the person is 
likely to experience shame, lowered self-esteem and not attempt to 
cope with the situation; therefore thus a full-blown relapse is more 
probable. The cause of the lapse may be seen as external but 
controllable (e.g., the HRS is seen as the trigger but the person sees 
that he could remove himself) and the resulting affect is likely to be 
guilt. Again, guilt is likely to motivate the offender to avoid 
relapsing. 
Where the cause of the lapse is external but uncontrollable, 
there are two possibilities, depending on whether the externally 
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Table 1. Attribution-affective links 
Dimensions illustrative cause Offender's 
affect 
Internal controllable "It's my fault I have not tried hard enough Guilt 
to keep to my plan. I should not have 
driven this way home." 
Internal uncontrollable "I have no willpower. I am a disgusting Shame 
person." 
External controllable 'This kid is really sexy but I could stop Guilt 
looking at her." 
External uncontrollable "It's not my fault I am aroused, there are Hopelessness 
"(nonperson cause) sexual images everywhere." 
. External uncontrollable "She is stupid to be here alone. It's her Anger 
(person cause) fault I'm"aroused." 
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attributed cause is viewed as resulting from unfortunate 
circumstances or from the actions of another person. Clinicians 
frequently note the tendency of clients to "excuse" themselves by 
attributing responsibility for lapses to, for example, partners or stress 
(Le., external and uncontrollable). When some unfortunate but 
unavoidable circumstance is seen as the cause of the lapse, 
unhappiness is an expected consequent emotional state. If the cause 
is also seen as stable, hopelessness would occur. In these 
circumstances the offender will see no point in trying to avoid a 
relapse. Where the cause of the lapse is seen as being the result of 
another person's actions (i.e., where the offender sees, for example, 
the victim is the cause of his lapse), the woman or child is seen by the 
offender as having put themselves in a risky situation. The victim 
may be seen as having been deliberately seductive or careless. Under 
these circumstances the offender will consider himself justifiably ~. 
angry at the victim for having provoked him and thus feels justified 
in assaulting him/her. 
The attributional scenarios above constitute a general set of 
possibilities and seem to represent the essence of the reformulated 
AVE. Certainly, a number of other variations or examples are 
possible and it may be that slight variations in the circumstances may 
result in somewhat different emotional responses. Weiner (1986) 
argues that locus, controllability and stability are best thought of as 
dimensions rather than categories, so that the degree to which 
attributions reflect locations along these dimensions, will influence 
the affective response. 
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IMPLICATIONS OF mE REFORMULATION 
An important part of theory appraisal involves conceptual 
elegance, explanatory depths, as well as heuristic value and 
integration across psychological domains (Haig 1987; Hooker, 1987; 
Staats, 1991). I believe that the reformulated AVE construct is 
broader, more integrated, and more parsimonious than the previous 
conceptualisation of the abstinence violation process. Therefore, it 
represents not only a conceptual improvement over the earlier 
version, but also has clear advantages for clinical work with sex 
offenders. 
The reformulated AVE avoids the need to add concepts from 
self-efficacy theory, efficacy expectations are part of Weiner's (1986) 
account. Similarly, for self-awareness theory; it is not necessary to 
refer to additional, attentional mechanisms, nor is it necessary to 
invoke a comparison of ideal and actual behaviour. The conflict 
view of motivation, embodied in cognitive dissonance theory, is also 
unnecessary. Nor does the reformulated AVE require a reference to 
drive theory to account for the escalation and maintenance of 
addictive behaviour. There is a clear link between cognition, 
emotion and behaviour in Weiner's attributional theory. It predicts 
failure to cope entirely as a consequence of specific attributions and 
the emotional states they induce. 
The reformulated A VE makes clear predictions concerning the 
links between cognition, affect and behaviour, and recognises the 
greater range of emotional possibilities in response to particular 
causal attributions, than does the earlier AVE construct. These 
differing emotional responses have different implications for 
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outcome and need to be addressed quite specifically in treatment if we 
are to minimise resistance to relapse. 
It is possible that different groups of sex offenders have different 
attributional routes to the final common pathway of behaving in a 
sexually offensive or aggressive manner. For example, anger and 
hostility towards their victims is more commonly observed in rapists 
(Segal & Stermac, 1990) than in child sex offenders, which suggests 
that rapists are more likely to attribute blame for their lapses to 
woman (Le., external and uncontrollable). Child molesters more 
often experience guilt and shame about their offences which tends to 
suggest that they attribute responsibility to themselves, (Le., internal 
and either controllable or uncontrollable causes). 
Because sexual aggression involves a chain of behaviour or 
responses, it is possible that causal attributions and their consequent 
emotions may be modified if this chain unfolds over time. 
Attributions occurring after important events are clearly dynamic 
rather than unchanging. Therefore it makes sense to examine specific 
changes in both causal attributions and emotions across the offence 
behaviour chain. For example, a child molester may argue with his 
wife, become angry or depressed and begin to fantasise about having 
sex with a child. At this point he may attribute blame for his 
fantasising to the "bitchy" nature, as he sees it, of all females, thereby 
justifying the initiation of the behaviour chain leading to an assault. 
However, once he is in a HRS, such as a park, waiting for a potential 
victim to appear, his anger may have dissipated and he may see 
himself as unable to exert control at this point. Consequently he will 
feel shame at being unable to stop his planned attack. These 
possibilities suggest that one aspect of research into attributional 
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process should examine attributions and emotions at varied points in 
the relapse sequence. 
Taking into account the above criticisms of Marlatt's work, it is 
important not to study the A VE, and it's related processes, only as 
defined in his model. That is, as likely to be more intense if 
attributions are global, internal and stable. An obvious problem is 
that Marlatt has neglected the important dimension of controllability, 
although as stated above, it is certainly implicit in his RP model of the 
AVE. In Marlatt's construal of the AVE (a dimensional and 
composite construct) high globality, stability, and internal locus are 
located at one end of a continuum, with specific, external and 
unstable attributions at the other. It is also not clear how the other 
attributional dimensions, or' the other clusters of dimensions as 
postulated by Weiner, are related to a lapse/relapse. There are 
important advantages in considering the attributional dimensions 
separately as outlined in the. chapter on reformulation. Different 
attributional dimensions are hypothesised to cause different 
emotions, which in conjunction with expectations, can ultimately 
lead to a lapse or relapse. 
CLASSIFICA nON 
There has been no research into the relationship between 
offender type and the AVE, although clearly this is an important issue 
that may have an impact on relapse. I will briefly discuss the problem 
of classification and outline the typology used in this thesis. 
There have been a number of different classification systems 
advocated in the literature on child molestation (Knight & Prentky, 
1989; Lanyon, 1986). They have ranged from theoretically driven 
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typologies to the relatively atheoretical criteria of the DSM llI-R 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). The controversy continues 
regarding the relative merits of the competing systems, and indeed, over 
the more fundamental issue of classification itself (Millon, 1991; Simon, 
Sales, Kaszniak, & Kahn, 1992). Clinical psychology and psychiatry have 
long debated the issue of classification and diagnosis (a form of 
classification) and associated problems such as whether a dimensional or 
a categorical system has greater validity (Millon, 1991). There have been 
disagreements concerning the appropriate methodology and whether 
classification systems ought to be theoretically or empirically derived 
(Knight & Prentky, 1990). Classification is valuable because it gives 
clinicians and researchers a common language when discussing research 
or clinical issues and problems. It also provides a focus for theory 
development by the way of identifying basic patterns in a data set. In 
order to theorise about a problem it is first necessary to identify it in 
some way (Haig, 1987). There is always more then one way to look at a 
data set or e~pirical problem; theories are inevitably under determined 
by the data (Haig, 1987; Hooker, 1987). When it comes to evaluating a 
theory or classification system (which is a lower level theory) conceptual 
criteria are also important, for example, simplicity, fruitfulness, 
coherence with other theories, logical consistency, and so on (Haig, 
1987). 
From a clinical perspective, one of the more helpful and 
heuristic classification systems in the child molestation area has been 
articulated by Groth, Hobson and Gary (1982), although it has been 
criticised (Simon et al., 1992). They classify child sex offenders (see 
table 2) into fixated or regressed types. Fixated offenders were viewed 
as suffering from arrested psychosocial development. The offending 
typically began in adolescence in the attempt to establish pseudo-
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parental or pseudo-romantic relationships with his victims. The 
offending behaviour was usually premeditated, persistent, 
compulsive, and accompanied by firmly entrenched cognitive 
distortions concerning the legitimacy and beneficial nature of child-
adult sexual contact. 
In contrast, the regressed type of offender is seen as having had a 
normal psychosocial development. His offending tends to occur 
during times of perceived high levels of stress and is episodic. At 
these times he feels alienated from adults and is drawn to children 
who are perceived as less threatening and more accepting. The 
relationship with his victims tends to be a pseudo-adult one and the 
offending is impulsive. Contrary to the view of Groth et al., in this 
study, the distinction between fixated and regressed offenders is 
viewed in dimensional rather than in categorical terms. 
It is important to stress that while any classification of sub types 
of child molesters is subject to debate, particularly those systems that 
embody psychodynamic assumptions, there appears to me to be a 
reasonable consensus that the broad distinctions reflected in the terms 
fixated and regressed have clinical value. They of course suffer the 
inherent problems of any categorical system, as opposed to 
dimensional, but remain useful and reflect a clinical heuristic 
(Millon, 1991). 
Table 2 
Typology of child molesters 
Fixated type 
Primary sexual orientation 
is to children 
Pedophilic interests emerge 
in adolescence 
Usually no precipitating 
stress/no subjective distress 
Persistent interest and 
compulsive behaviour 
Premeditated, preplanned 
offences 
Identifies with child 
Male victims primary target 
Regressed type 
Primary sexual orientation is 
to agemates 
Pedophilic interests usually 
not evident 
Precipitating stress usually 
evident 
Involvements more episodic 
depending more on stress 
Initial offence may be 
impulsive, not premeditated 
Substitutes child for adult 
Female victims primary target 
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Little or no sexual contact 
with agemates 
Sexual contact with child coexists 
agemates contact 
Usually no history of 
substance abuse 
Offence is often alcohol 
related 
Characterological immaturity; Under developed peer 
poor sociosexual peer relationships 
relationships 
(Adapted from Groth, Hobson, & Gary, 1982) 
CHAPTER FOUR 
HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE 
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In this study, my aim is to extend the recent work researching the 
AVE into the area of sexual aggression. I set out to provide an empirical 
test of the A VB in child sex offenders and also to examine attributions 
and emotions at various points in the relapse sequence. Additionally, I 
am interested in whether or not emotions and attributions function 
more as traits across the offence chain, or rather fluctuate according to 
both internal and situational factors (Le., state variables). 
Although a number of researchers (Abel, Mittleman, Becker, 
Rathner & Rouleau, 1988; Gudjanssan, 1990; Jenkins-Hall, 1989; Pithers, 
1990) have commented.on the important role distorted cognitions play 
in facilitating both initial offending and relapse, there has been a dearth 
of empirical studies providing data on the A VB in sex offenders. 
I will now outline the hypotheses guiding this study. 
HYPOTHESESIRESEARCH OUESTIONS 
This is a descriptive and exploratory study focusing on the 
following puzzles or hypotheses: 
(a) Does the AVE occur in child sex offenders? If so, at what point in 
the offence chain does it occur? The issue of temporal variation 
over the offence chain is of importance, not only from a theoretical 
perspective but because of the morally driven changes in the 
relapse model for sexual offending, regarding the definition of the 
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lapse and relapse. In the other addictive disorders, a lapse is 
defined as the, for example, first cigarette or drink, and a relapse a 
return to problematic levels of addiction or pretreatment levels. 
This is clearly unacceptable for sex offenders. However, the 
temporal backward shift in the offence chain is not necessarily a 
reality for offenders. 
(b) Do attributional dimensions change across the offence chain? Are 
they (and therefore the attributions or causes they reflect) more 
usefully conceptualised in trait or state terms? The majority of 
researchers into the AVE have used a modified attributional style 
measure. This appears to be a mistake as a lapse, which is 
hypothesised to precipitate an attributional search, is a unique 
event specific to an individuaL However this is an empirical issue 
that hopefully this study will clarify. 
Following on from the reformulation of the A VE outlined in 
chapter two, there is utility in also investigating the various 
attributional pathways to lapse and relapse separately. This 
involves examining the relationship of the attributional pairs 
outlined in table one to emotions (see below) and secondly, finding 
whether or not the subjects experiencing the AVE tend to cluster 
more into the internal-uncontrollable cell as predicted by Marlatt. 
Marlatt argues that the intensity of the A VE will be greater if an 
attribution is made to factors that are stable, internal and global and 
perceived to be uncontrollable. Therefore you would expect higher 
scores on each of these dimensions (although Marlatt does not 
explicitly include controllability as part of the attributional 
component of the A VE, he does discuss the important role of the 
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perception of uncontrollability in creating this effect) in those 
subjects experiencing the AVE. 
(c) Do emotions change across the offence chain, if so, in what 
direction, positive or negative? Clearly, this has been a neglected 
area in research into the A VE. It is important to obtain more data 
on both the kinds of emotions associated with the A VE, and the 
degree of change across the offence chain. 
(d) What are the relationships between attributional dimensions and 
emotions? What, therefore, are the different attributional 
pathways mediating lapse/relapse? I have argued in chapter three 
that Marlatt's formulation of the AVE is inadequate and probably 
fails to account for a number of important attributional-emotion-
relapse relationships. Although this issue is of secondary 
importance in this study, hopefully the data obtained will suggest 
some trends or clarify some of these links. 
(e) Do different types of offenders experience the AVE to a greater or 
lessor extent? Do they have different patterns of attributions (i.e., 
attributional dimensions) and emotions across the offence chain? 
As mentioned earlier, the whole issue of offender type and the 
AVE, or even the more general area of cognitive distortions and 
offender type, has been neglected in the sex offender field. Of 
course, a major obstacle in doing this kind of research is the lack of 
consensus concerning a valid classification system (Knight & 
Prentky, 1990; Simon et al., 1992). In this study, I am using the 
fixated/regressed typology (Groth et al., 1982) despite the problems 
of a categorical classification system (Simon et al, 1992). Because 
classification and the AVE are not the major focus of this study, it is 
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reasonable to use such an easily applied typology to obtain some 
initial data. 
A number of hypotheses concerning the A VE follow from the 
typology of child molesters used in this study. First, fixated 
offenders would be less likely to experience an AVE following 
offending behaviour. Because of their entrenched distorted beliefs 
and attitudes concerning sex with children, and the tendency to 
build a lifestyle based on such relationships, it is thought unlikely 
that a lapse or relapse would be construed of as violating rules 
forbidding such behaviour. However, the regressed offenders 
would normally view sex with children as unacceptable; therefore 
they would be more likely to experience an A VE following sexual 
thoughts or behaviour with children. 
Second, following on from this analysis, fixated offenders 
would experience heightened and greater frequency of positive 
emotions across the offence chain than regressed offenders. 
Correspondingly, fixated offenders would experience fewer negative 
emotions than regressed offenders. 
Third, taking into account their persistent offending, fixated 
offenders would tend to make more stable attributions concerning 
the cause of their sexually assaultive behaviour. In view of their 
proclivity to base a lifestyle around pedophilic preferences, one 
would also expect fixated offenders to show a high rating on the 
attributional dimension of globality. 
(f) What kind of reasons or causes do child sex offenders give for their 
offending? Do these reasons change across the offence chain? 
Although the major factor of interest as far as attributions are 
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concerned are the attributional dimensions, it is still important to 
obtain data concerning specific attributions. In a sense, reasons or 
causes, reflect an offender's implicit theories concerning their 
victims and offending, and therefore are of considerable interest for 
therapists. It is also important to discover whether these reasons 
change across the offence chain. 
(g) Do the different types of sexual offenders give different kind of 
reasons for their sexual aggression? Similarly, it is important to 
gather data on the kinds of reasons different offenders give for their 
actual offending, and the behaviour associated with their offending. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
METHOD 
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Researchers have consistently stressed the importance of using 
ecologically valid methods and measures when assessing cognitive 
variables (Clark, 1988; Dobson, 1988; Safran & Segal, 1990; Segal & Shaw, 
1988). An important finding is that at this point of time no single 
approach to cognitive assessment has been demonstrated to be superior 
to others (Clark, 1988; Haaga, 1989). 
In this study I have attempted to incorporate these concerns by 
using an assessment method that allows the subjects to identify their 
own reason(s) for offending and behaviour associated with offending. In 
addition, I have used a direct rating approach where subjects directly rate 
their reported reasons on the different attributional dimensions. 
Regarding ecological validity, I have used an analogue approach where 
the subject uses his own history to construct an offence vignette and in a 
sense, "relives" this during the assessment session. For obvious reasons 
it is not possible to recreate actual offence situations so this approach 
creates as much realism as is practically possible and ethically 
permissib Ie. 
SUBJECTS AND SElTING 
The subjects were undergoing the assessment phase before 
participating in the Kia Marama Sexual Offender Treatment Programme 
(Marshall, Johnston, Ward, Jones, & Hudson, 1992), a purpose built unit 
in a medium, security prison in New Zealand, all were Caucasian and 
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had provided an informed consent to be involved in the project. Seven 
potential subjects were excluded because they were illiterate, of 
borderline intelligence, or dementing. A further one man denied 
having committed any offence and so was not able to participate; 
similarly, with two men who were repeating the programme. 
The testing was carried out in the laboratory of the treatment unit 
which had a screen to separate the subject and researcher and a 
comfortable chair in which the subject was seated. 
DEPENDENT MEASURES 
The Differential Emotion Scale (DES) 
This self-report scale (Izard, Doughty, Bloxom and Kotsch, 1974) 
measures the presence of twelve basic emotions using a 5 point Likert 
Scale. These fundamental emotions are labelled interest, joy, surprise, 
sadness, anger, disgust, contempt, hostility (inner-directed), fear, shame, 
shyness, and guilt. There are 36 items, 3 per emotion, with scores 
ranging from 3 - 15. It has a number of different forms; the one used in 
this study was the DES IV a state measure designed specifically for 
children, young adults and adults with limited education. This version 
of the DES consists of 36 phrases that describe different emotions. The 
subject reads each phrase and indicates the extent to which it describes 
the way they feel. The reliability and validity of the DES has, been 
investigated in a number of studies and its psychometric properties have 
consistently been found to be satisfactory (Boyle, 1984, 1987; Kotsch, 
Gerbing, & Schwartz, 1982). According to Izard et al., (1974) the reliability 
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of the state version of the DES can only be assessed in terms of the 
internal consistency of the items, although Boyle (1984) found the test-
retest reliability for this form to be up to 0.7. Concerning internal 
consistency, the average coefficient alpha for the state version has been 
calculated to be 0.84 (Izard et al., 1974). The construct validity of the DES 
has been established in a number of studies and with a variety of 
methods, typically involving factor analysis or a comparison of the DES 
to similar instruments measuring constructs that overlap with discrete 
emotions (Boyle, 1987; Boyle & Katz, 1991; Izard et al., 1974). Factor 
analytic studies have revealed the presence of two secondary factors, with 
factor one essentially defined by a combination of negative mood states, 
and factor two, by positive mood states (Boyle, 1987). 
The Four Attributional Dimension Scale (4-ADS) 
There has been little empirical work done in the area of the 
measurement of attributions and attributional dimensions (Benson, 
1989; Weary et al., 1989). Benson (1989), Elig and Frieze 1979, and Russell, 
McAuley and Tarico (1987) found that the most reliable and valid 
method of measuring attributional dimensions is the direct rating 
method. In this class of techniques the subject first states his/her reason 
for a behaviour or outcome and then rates the reason on attributional 
dimensions. Benson (1989) developed the 4 ADS which he found to be 
superior to Russell's (1982) Causal Dimension Scale (another direct 
rating scale). In contrast to Russell's Scale, the 4~ADS includes the 
dimension of Globality and has 4 items as opposed to 3, for each 
dimension. In addition, the inclusion of verbal anchoring for each 
82 
choice and more easily understood items, eliminate the need for 
additional administration instructions. This scale (Benson, 1989) directly 
relates attributions across a number of circumstances or events. The 
subject states the major reason or cause for an event or circumstance 
(they may give more than one) and then completes 16 x 5 point scales, 4 
for each of the 4 dimensions; controllability, locus, stability, and globality. 
The scale is appropriate for use with subjects ranging in age from middle 
childhood to adulthood and has been found to have satisfactory 
psychometric properties (Benson, 1989). The median test-retest reliability 
coefficient has been calculated to be 0.72, with a range of 0.59 to 0.79 
(Benson, 1989). Regarding construct validity, Benson (1989) found that 
the 4-ADS yielded results consistent with attribution theory in 
demonstrating predicted differences in attributional dimensions 
following success or failure outcomes. His results also demonstrated the 
independence of the causal dimensions and the predicted relationship 
between attributional dimensions and performance mediators such as 
expectations. The 4-ADS was modified slightly in this study as in the 
original, the internal and external perspectives of control are 
confounded. Consequently, "someone" in the items controllability 11 
and 16 was changed to "you". In addition the direction of the 
controllability scores was reversed to make it consistent with the 
direction of the other dimensions. Therefore a high score on this 
dimension now means that a subject perceives himself to have little 
control over an outcome or behaviour, rather than the reverse. 
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PROCEDURE 
Subjects constructed a written vignette describing their most recent 
or typical offence and subsequently read this onto audio tape (they were 
given instructions how to do this). For all men the most recent offence 
was also the most typical. The men were given instructions to write up 
to two A4 pages in the first person, present tense and to provide a 
description of background conditions as well as the events and actions 
surrounding the actual offence. Each vignette was divided into three 
sections according to the following rules. Segment One comprised a 
HRS, where the subject's sense of self-control over sexual behaviour was 
threatened (pithers, 1990); Segment Two contained the lapse defined as a 
behaviour occurring before the actual offence, but which reflects the 
intention to offend and increases the probability of the offence being 
committed (e.g., approaching a child in the park and asking him/her to 
sit beside him); Segment Three described the first instance of any sexual 
behaviour, that is relapse. 
Subjects were then asked to imagine themselves back in the 
situation they had described and to listen to the audio tape description of 
their offence. They did this individually, in private, whilst sitting in a 
recliner chair in a screened off area in the laboratory. At the end of each 
segment, they were asked to identify the major reason (they were 
permitted to give more than one) for the behaviour or circumstances 
they had just described. They then filled in both the DES and 4-ADS (the 
order of the questionnaires was alternated). The subjects were instructed 
to respond as closely as they could to how they would have responded at 
the time. They were also told there were no right or wrong answers and 
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the information they gave was confidential and would have no bearing 
on their possible release date. It was suggested to the men that their 
responses may change each time they completed the various scales but 
they should not try to be consistent but just reply appropriately at each 
point. The questionnaires were removed from the men as they had 
completed them. Following the completion of Segment Three, subjects 
were asked to focus on their emotions after sexual activity had finished. 
Subjects were then debriefed, especially concerning any distress 
experienced as a consequence of the task. 
DEFINITIONS 
The following arbitrary decisions were made to define the presence 
or absence of an abstinence violation effect. They are arbitrary in two 
senses; none of the theorists in the area have established any universally 
accepted criteria by which the effect is known and secondly, it is more 
likely that the effect constitutes a continuum. 
In the primary analysis the Curry et aI., (1987) method of defining 
the AVE was used because it provides a solution to the problem of 
integrating the scores from the different attributional dimensions in a 
way that is consistent with Marlatt's formulation, that is, as a composite 
phenomenon. 
I will first use the Curry et a!., (1987) definition of the A VE with the 
addition of controllability and average across the four attributional 
dimensions of globality, stability, controllability and locus, arriving at a 
composite score. The 12 basic emotions as measured by the DES (Izard 
1974), with the exception of surprise and shyness, will be collapsed into 
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two broad categories of affect, positive (2) and negative (8) affect scores. 
This is consistent with Marlatt's model and the factor analytic research 
into the DES (Boyle, 1987). 
An AVE was defined in any of the following three ways. Firstly, in 
terms of emotions, if the negative emotions on the DES were greater than 
the median score for the group as a whole, and if positive emotions were 
less than the relevant median score. The attributional component of an 
AVE was defined according to a median split of the composite scores 
derived from the four attributional dimensions, with high scores being 
associated with the presence of an AVE. This results in a conventional 
AVE (Le., a Marlatt type). Secondly, an alternative but related possibility, 
involves both high attributions, high negative and high positive affect, and 
is consistent with Pithers observation regarding the PIG. Thirdly, it seems 
reasonable to define an AVE in emotional terms alone, that is high 
negative and low positive emotions, as the attributional score may reflect 
cognitive distortions, particularly in incarcerated offenders. 
Subjects whose scores did not exhibit these characteristics were rated 
either unclassifiable (typically high on both positive and negative emotions 
and low on attributions) or as 'not abstinence violation effect' (NAVE) 
where scores were clear-cut but in the opposite direction to those for the 
A VE (i.e., low scores on negative emotions, with high positive emotion 
scores). 
Following this primary analysis I will examine the relationship of 
the pairs of attributional dimensions outlined in table one to the 
different emotions, and therefore indirectly, to lapse and relapse. This 
further analysis is an attempt to extend the attributional approach to 
relapse. The pairs of dimensions to be analysed further are: 
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internal/ controllable, internal/ uncontrollable, external/ controllable, 
external/uncontrollable. All subjects who experienced an AVE will be 
split into high/low groups depending on their scores on the locus and 
controllability dimensions and assigned to one of four cells: (1) internal-
high controllability (2) internal-uncontrollability (3) external-high 
controllability (4) external-uncontrollability. A median split will be used 
to divide the groups as it is less influenced by extreme scores than the 
mean. The relationships between these attributional dimensions and 
the individual emotions of the DES will then be examined. 
Of course, to comprehensively test Weinerts theory concerning the 
relationships between attributional dimensions and emotions, all the 
possible combinations of dimensions and emotions would need to be 
investigated. However the major aim of this study is to obtain data on 
the AVE in child molesters and therefore this further analysis, while 
worthwhile, is of secondary importance 
CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECTS 
The small number of subjects used in this study meant that it was 
not possible to use a complex classification system, for example, the 
MTC;CM3 (Knight & Prentky, 1990). Therefore the fixated/regressed 
dichotomy (Groth et aL, 1982) was used in order to guide further analysis, 
(see table 2 ). 
Therapists judged which subjects were most adequately classified as 
fixated-preferential or regressed/ situational offenders and were guided by 
the following instructions (Groth, Hobson, & Gary, 1982). Fixated 
offender's onset of offending is typically in adolescence, drugs are rarely 
87 
involved in offences, the relationship with the victim(s) is pseudo-
parental-romantic, and the offending is typically persistent, compulsive 
and involves premeditation. In contrast, regressed offenders offending is 
more typically episodic, stress related with drugs commonly involved, 
the victim abuser relationship of a pseudo-adult type and a lifestyle 
involving marriage but characterised by impulsivity (see table 2). 
CLASSIFICA nONS OF REASONS 
In addition, the reasons offenders gave at each of the three steps 
were classified according to criteria developed after consulting the 
relevant sex offender literature, (Marques et al., 1989; Pithers et al., 1988). 
The reasons given were placed Into categories and checked by another 
person. Agreement was reached concerning these categories, which are 
as follows: 
(1) Sexual arousal. 
(2) Intimacy, desire for closeness. 
(3) Negative affect (Le., anxiety, sadness, loneliness). 
(4) Power, aggression. 
(5) Positive affect. 
(6) Curiosity-helping. 
(7) Other. 
In summary, twenty-six incarcerated male child molesters were 
assessed, using the Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, Doughty, Bloxom, & 
Kotsch, 1974) and the Four Attributional Dimension Scale (Benson, 1989), 
at three points (background, lapse, and relapse) while they listened to an 
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audiotaped recording of a description of their most typical offence chain. 
Subjects were also classified as either fixated or regressed according to age of 
onset of their offending, quality of the relationship with the victim, 
lifestyle issues, stress, and drug use. 
The independent variables in this study are breakpoints, offender 
type (fixated versus regressed), and the AVE versus not AVE (NA VE and 
unc1assifiable). The dependent variables are the demographic features 
(IQ, age, number of victim's etc), 4-ADS scores, DES scores and reasons. 
ANALYSIS 
CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS 
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A within subject repeated measures design was used. All data were 
subjected to repeated measures analyses of variance using StatView 
(Abacus, 1986) and post hoc multiple comparisons using Fisher's PLSD. I 
will describe the results relevant to subjects, vignettes, and then each of the 
hypotheses outlined earlier. 
SUBJECTS 
Twenty-six incarcerated male child molesters (mean age = 42.9 
years, SD = 11.9, range = 18-64 years; mean IQ = 110.5, SD = 12.4, range = 
90-132) were finally involved in this study (see table 3 for further details). 
With respect to classification, there were significant differences between 
the Fixated or Regressed groups on the following variables, number of 
past convictions, E (1, 25) == 9.05, p.<.005 and length of offending history, E 
(1, 25) = 7.76, p.<.01. While there was not a significant difference between 
the two groups in terms of the number of victims there was a trend 
(p.=.06) in this direction. These differences provide some support for the 
therapists classification of subjects into the fixated/regressed groups. 
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Table 3 
Demogral2hic characteristics of subjects(Fixated n=11, Regressed n=15) 
Fixated regressed total 
M SQ M SQ M SQ Rangs: 
Age 40.9 12.8 45.6 10.5 42.9 11.9 18-64 
IQ 111.0 14.0 110.0 11.0 110.5 12.4 90-132 
Sentence Length 51 39 34.6 18 41.2 28.1 18-120 
(months) 
Number of previous 1.9 2.2 1.3 .35 .84 1.63 0-6 
convictions 
Number of victims 32.3 58 3.3 2 15.5 39.2 1-200 
Length of offending 7.5 9.2 8.2 7.6 12.1 9.4 1-30 
history 
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VIGNETfES 
The average number of words in the vignettes was 602.4 (SD, 148.7); that is, 
between one and two A4 pages. 
Reliability checks were carried out for the classification of the reasons 
into the seven categories (reliability coefficient = 89%) and the vignettes 
into the three segments. The experimenter and a research assistant initially 
divided the scenario's into the segments and where there was 
disagreement, consensus was negotiated. As an additional check, a third 
person independently classified a sample (8 from 26) randomly selected 
from all the vignettes, into the three sections. The classifications did not 
differ more than one sentence and this was judged to be insignificant. 
HYPOTHESESIRESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(a) The AVE in child molesters 
Significantly fewer subjects experienced an AVE at the point of lapse 
than did not show an AVE, X2 (1, N = 26) = 5.4,1:2 <.05 (see table 4). 
Conversely a significantly greater number of subjects exhibited an AVE 
than not, at the point of relapse, X2 (1, N = 26) = 3.9,1:2 <.05 (see table 4). That 
is, significantly more subjects experience an AVE at relapse compared to at 
the point of lapse, X2 (1, N = 26) = 4.7,1:2 <.05 (see table 4). 
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Table 4 
Abstinence Violation Effect 
phase 
lapse relapse 
type total total 
AVEa 4 6 
AVE2b 2 5 
EAVEc 1 7 
sub-totals 7 18 
NAVEd 13 2 
UCLASSe 6 6 
sub-totals 19 8 
Note a An AVE defined by high attributions, high negative affect, and 
low positive affect. 
b An A VE defined by high attributions, high negative affect, and 
high positive affect. . 
c Emotional AVE defined by high negative affect, and low 
positive affect. 
d A NAVE - the antithesis of the AVE. 
e Unclassifiable 
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Table 5 
Attributional dimensions across scenario segments 
Segment 
one two three 
uncontrollability 10.8 10.8 11.1 
locus 14.9 15.2 15.5 
stability 14.9 14.0 13.7 
globality 11.3 10.9 11.6 
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(b) Attributional dimensions across the offence chain 
There were no significant differences in any of the four attributional 
dimensions across the three segments of the relapse process (see table 5). 
Attributional dimensions and the abstinence violation effect 
Subjects exhibiting an AVE showed significantly higher scores on 
uncontrollability, E (1, 72) = 13.4,12<.001 and stability, E (1, 72) = 4.29, 12<.05 
(see table 6). 
Frequency of Attributional Pairs 
In view of the near equivalence of cell frequencies for the attributional 
pairs, statistical testing was not carried out (see table 7) 
(dEmotions across the offence chain 
There were significant increases in the emotions disgust, E (2, 72) = 
4.11,12<.05, hostility, E (2,72) = 3.45,12<.05, shyness, E (2, 72) = 4.31,12<.05 and 
guilt, E (2, 72) = 13.18,12<.001, and a significant decrease in the emotion 
interest, E (2, 72) = 3.65,12<.05 between segments 2 and 3 of the relapse 
process (Le., between the point of lapse and that of having relapsed) (see 
table 8). None of the other emotions showed significant change. 
Emotions and the abstinence violation effect 
Subjects exhibiting an A VE reported significantly higher scores than 
those subjects not showing evidence of an AVE on the following DES 
emotions; anger, E (1, 72) = 6.26,12<.05, disgust, E (1, 72) = 7.20,12<.01, 
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contempt, E (1, 72) = S.93, 12<.OS, hostility, E (1, 72) = S.78, 12<.OS, fear, E (1,72) 
= S.26, 12<.OS, shame, E (1, 72) = 6.02, 12<.OS, and shyness, E (1,72) = 9.5S, 12<.01 
(see table 9). Significantly lower emotion scores were reported by the AVE 
group for joy, E (1, 72) = 10.67,12<.01, and surprise, E (1, 72) = 6.14, 12<.OS (see 
table 9). 
(d) Relationship between attributional dimensions and emotions 
All F ratios were less than 1 (NS) with the exception of surprise which 
was also non-significant F (3, 2S) = 1.71, p = .2 (see table 10). 
(e) Offender type and the AVE 
The AVE 
There were no significant differences in the frequency of an AVE 
between fixated and regressed subjects at the point of lapse, X2 (1) = 2.7,!lli, 
and relapse, X2 (1) = .8, ns (see Table 11). Similarly the were no significant 
differences in the frequency of the "absence of an AVE (NAVE and 
unclassifiable) at both the point of lapse, X2 (1) = 0.0,!lli, and relapse, X2 (1) = 
0.0, ns. 
Emotions and offender type 
The fixated group showed significantly higher DES scores than the 
regressed group for the emotions interest, E(l, 72) = S.49, 12< .OS, and joy, E 
(1, 72) = 10.28,12< .00S,and significantly lower scores on the emotions 
sadness, E(l, 72) = 9.71,12< .OOS, anger, E(l, 72) = S.04, 12< .OS, disgust, E(l, 
72) = 6.84,12< .01, hostility, E(l, 72) = 14.91,12< .001, fear, E(l, 72) = IS. IS, 12< 
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.001, shame, E(l, 72) = 3.58, );2< .05, shyness, E(l, 72) 10.77, );2< .005, and 
guilt, E(l, 72) = 10.37, );2< .05 (see table 12). The emotions surprise, and 
contempt showed no significant differences between the two groups. There 
were no significant interactions between emotion scores and the scenario 
segments associated with the points of lapse or relapse. 
Attributional dimensions and offender type 
Regressed subjects showed significant lower scores on the attributional 
dimension of stability than fixated subjects, E(l, 72) = 7.18,);2< .01 (see table 
13). There were no other significant differences or interactions over the 
three points in the relapse process between the two groups. 
Subjects experiencing the AVE at relapse 
Stability scores were significantly higher for fixated offenders (M = 
16.9, SD = 2.4) than for regressed offenders (M = 13.6, SD = 4.7) E(l, 53) = 9.21, 
);2 < .005. No significant differences were found between regressed and 
fixated types of offenders for controllability scores E(l, 53) < 1, ns (M = 12.2 
and 11.5, and SD = 3.1 and 4.8), locus scores E(l, 53) < 1, ns (M = 14.8 and 
15.3, and SD = 4.0 and 2.5 respectively), or globality scores, E(l, 53) = 2.89,);2 
= .1 (M = 10.8 and 13.0, and SD = 4.4 and 5.2 respectively). 
Subjects not experiencing the AVE at relapse 
There was no significant differences in controllability, locus, stability 
or globality scores according to offender classification, E(l, 23) < 1 in all 
cases. 
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Table 6 
Attributional dimensions across presence or absence of the AVE 
Group 
AVE NAVE 
uncontrollability 11.9 8.6 
locus 15.0 15.7 
stability 14.8 12.8 
globality 11.6 lOA 
Note. a significant at 12 < .05. 
b signifieant at 12 < .001 
**b 
*a 
NAVE group includes unclassifiable subjects 
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Table 7 
Frequency of attributional pair (locus X controllability) 
Attributional pair 
Int/cont*a Int/ucon*b Ext/con*c Ext/uncon*d 
All subjects 5 7 8 6 
AVE subjects 4 5 4 5 
Note: a Int/ con means internal locus and controllable. 
b Int/uncon'means internal locus and uncontrollable. 
c Ext/con means external locus and controllable. 
d Ext/uncon means external locus and uncontrollable. 
Table 8 
Emotions across scenario segments 
Segment 
one two three 
interest 9.7 10.9 7.7 
joy 8.5 8.7 6.9 
surprise 6.3 7.5 8.2 
sadness 5.5 5.4 8.2 
anger 5.5 5.0 6.5 
disgust 5.0 5.4 8.6 
contempt 5.1 5.0 5.7 
hostility 5.4 6.0 9.2 
fear 6.3 6.7 8.9 
shame 5.5 5.6 7.1 
shyness 5.9 6.0 9.2 
guilt 5.4 5.5 10.6 
Note. a significant at 12 < .05. 
NAVE group includes unclassifiable subjects 
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*a 
* 
>I-
* 
>I-
>I-
Table 9 
Emotions across presence or absence of the AVE 
Group 
AVE 
interest 9.1 
joy 7.1 
surprise 6.7 
sadness 6.8 
anger 6.3 
disgust 7.0 
contempt 5.7 
hostility 7.6 
fear 8.0 
shame 6.7 
shyness 7.8 
guilt 7.6 
Note. a significant at p. < .05. 
b significant at p. < .01 
NAVE 
10.0 
10.3 >l-a 
8.8 >I-
5.3 
4.3 >I-
4.8 >I-
4.2 >I-
5.3 >I-
5.7 >I-
4.6 >I-
5.2 **b 
6.3 
100 
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Table 10 
DES mean scores according to attributional pair 
Attributional pair 
Emotion 
Int/cont*a Int/ucon*b Ext/con*c Ext/uncon*d 
interest 7.0 6.7 8.4 8.3 
joy 4.2 7.4 7.8 7.3 
surprise 10.8 8.1 8.3 6.2 
sadness 8.8 7.9 6.9 9.7 
anger 8.0 6.7 5.5 6.5 
disgust 9.0 8.7 8.6 8.2 
contempt 4.4 6.9 5.5 6.0 
hostility 10.6 9.1 7.5 10.5 
fear 9.8 8.7 8.0 9.5 
shame 7.2 8.0 5.4 8.2 
shyness 10.0 9.6 7.9 9.8 
guilt 11.2 10.7 11.4 9.0 
Note: a Int/con means internal locus and controllable. 
b Int/uncon means internal locus and uncontrollable. 
c Ext/ con means external locus and controllable. 
d Ext/uncon means external locus and uncontrollable. 
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Table 11 
Abstinence Violation Effect Across Offender Type 
phase 
lapse relapse 
type fixated regressed total fixated regressed total 
AVEa 0 4 4 1 5 6 
AVE2b 2 0 2 4 1 5 
EAVEc 0 1 1 1 6 7 
sub-total 2 5 7 6 12 18 
NAVEd 7 6 '13 0 2 2 
UCLASSe 2 4 6 5 1 6 
sub-total 9 10 19 5 3 8 
Note: a An AVE defined by high attributions, high negative affect, and 
low positive affect. 
b An AVE defined by high attributions, high negative affect, and 
high positive affect. 
c Emotional A VE defined by high negative affect, and low positive 
affect. 
dANA VE - the antithesis of the AVE. 
e Unc1assifiable 
Table 12 
Emotions across regressed or fixated clar:H~ification 
Group 
regressed 
interest 8.6 
joy 6.8 
surprise 7.4 
sadness 7.4 
anger 6.4 
disgust 7.2 
contempt 5.3 
hostility 
fear 
shame 
shyness 
guilt 
Note. 
8.3 
8.7 
6.7 
8.1 
8.2 
a significant at 12 < .05. 
b significant at 12 < .01 
c significant at 12 < .001 
fixated 
10.4 *a 
9.7 **b 
7.2 
4.9 ** 
4.6 * 
5.1 ** 
5.2 
4.9 ***c 
5.3 *** 
5.2 * 
5.5 ** 
5.8 ** 
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Table 13 
Attributional dimensions across regressed or fixated classification 
un controllability 
locus 
stability 
globality 
Group 
regressed fixated 
11.1 
15.2 
13.1 
10.7 
10.6 
15.1 
15.6 
12.0 
Note. a significant at 12 < .01 
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Fixated offenders . 
Fixated offenders, experiencing the AVE at the point of relapse, 
reported greater stability than similar offenders not reporting an AVE (M = 
16.9 and 13.6, and SD = 2.4 and 2.7 respectively for AVE and NAVE 
offenders), E(l, 32) = 13.69,12< .001. Fixated offenders experiencing an AVE 
did not score significantly differently on the three other attributional 
dimensions compared to similar offenders not showing the AVE, E(l, 32) < 
1, ns for all cases. 
Regressed offenders 
Regressed offenders experiencing the AVE at the point of relapse, 
reported significantly less controllability compared to other regressed 
offenders not experiencing an' AVE, E(l, 44) = 15.46, 12 < .001 (M = 12.2 and 
8.2, and SD = 3.1 and 2.8 respectively for AVE's and NAVE's respectively). 
Regressed offenders experiencing an AVE did not score significantly 
differently on the three other attributional dimensions compared to similar 
offenders not showing the AVE, E(l, 32) < 1, ns for all cases. 
(n Reasons for offending 
Looking at the change of reasons there was no significant difference, 
although there was a trend for sexual arousal to significantly increase across 
the break points, X2 (1, N = 6) = 3.44 (see table 14). Collapsing reasons across 
the break points, a significantly greater number of subjects reported that 
sexual arousal was the primary reason for their behaviour, X2 (6, N = 26) = 
89.68, 12<.001. Taking sexual arousal out of the analysis, intimacy emerged as 
the next major reason for acting in a sexually aggressive manner, X2 (5, N = 
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26) = 13.35, 12= .05. Next intimacy was removed from the analysis as well as 
sexual arousal and the results were not significant. 
(g)Offender type and reasons 
The number of offender types within each category of reasons were 
either roughly equal or too small, therefore statistical analysis was not 
undertaken (see table 14) 
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Table 14 
Reasons given for behaviour at breakpoints 
breakpoints 
one two three total 
sexual arousal 11 15 20 46 
intimacy 5 7 5 17 
negative affect 4 3 2 9 
positive affect 4 2 0 6 
power 2 2 3 7 
helping 0 2 1 3 
other 3 3 2 8 
total 28 33 33 
Table 15 
Reason~ given for behaviour at break120ints 
breakpoints 
one two three total 
fix reg fix reg fix reg 
Reasons 
sexual arousal 5 6 8 7 10 10 46 
intimacy 3 2 4 3 3 2 17 
negative affect 3 1 3 0 2 0 9 
positive affect 2 2 0 2 0 0 6 
power 1 1 1 1 2 1 7 
helping 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 
other 2 1 3 0 1 1 8 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION 
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In this chapter I will firstly discuss the implications of the results for 
the hypotheses/puzzles outlined earlier. Secondly I will consider the 
limitations of the study. Finally, I will outline directions for future 
research. 
HYPOTIIESES !RESEARCH OUESTIONS 
(a) The AVE in child molesters 
There are four major implications that emerge from the data 
concerning the AVE. 
The first major implication is that the A VE does occur in child 
molesters, at least, in those who are incarcerated. The majority of subjects 
exhibited this effect at relapse. There are three types of A VE and the 
subjects were equally distributed across these three distinct types. Six 
showed evidence of a conventional A VE at relapse (high attributions, high 
negative and low positive affect). Five experienced both high negative and 
high positive affect in association with AVE relevant attributions 
(uncontrollable, internal, global, and stable) as suggested by Pithers (1990) 
but not referred to by Marlatt, even in his most recent work (George & 
Marlatt, 1989). The remaining seven exhibited an emotional A VE (high 
negative and low positive affect together with low attributions). This group 
did not exhibit the expected attributional profile but clearly responded 
emotionally. It is possible that they reflect social desirability concerns 
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regarding causality and therefore did not exhibit the expected attributional 
profile. Alternatively their reported emotions may reflect an attempt to 
present themselves in a more socially desirable way, when in reality their 
attitudes were unchanged. An additional possibility is that this particular 
group may find emotions easier to report. 
The second finding is that the AVE occurs more frequently at relapse 
rather than at the lapse point. This finding challenges Pithers claim that, as 
with other addictive disorders, the AVE in sex offenders occurs at the lapse 
point. In fact contrary to the accepted view, few of the subjects exhibited the 
AVE at this stage. The decision to change the definitions of lapse/relapse 
when adapting the RP model to sex offenders is driven by (understandable) 
. ethical concerns. However the data obtained in this study suggest that the 
subjects were probably more under the influence of the PIG at the point of 
lapsing rather than the A VE. Recall that in the generic RP model the PIG 
functions to facilitate the transition from a HRS to a lapse. The movement 
of the lapse point further back in the behaviour chain (in Pithers model) 
means that the PIG now becomes part of the AVE. Therefore instead of 
facilitating the transition from a HRS to a lapse as it does with other 
disorders, for sex offenders it operates as part of the lapse-relapse transition. 
In a sense this finding provides evidence for the validity of Marlatt's 
generic model. 
Clearly, the literature's definition of a lapse does not appear to be 
shared by the sex offender population (at least incarcerated child molesters); 
they are behaving in accord with the definition used in other areas of 
addictive behaviour. These men were recruited before treatment 
commenced but were highly motivated both to enter treatment and, by 
implication, to avoid behaving in a sexually offensive way. It therefore 
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seems apparent that changing these mens' definition of what constitutes 
events of substantial concern becomes a clear goal of therapy. Convincing 
them of the serious nature of the lapse point, and the therefore increased 
likelihood of the A VE, is an essential precursor to the successful coping 
with the lapse in a fashion that decreases the probability of relapse. In fact, 
the experiencing of an A VE following a lapse is more likely to be a 
consequence (hopefully) of therapy. Of course it is imperative that 
therapists ensure offenders do not experience the Marlatt version (stable, 
global and internal attributions) as this is likely to lead to a relapse. From a 
treatment perspective it is more desirable to teach them to regard the lapse, 
with its associated affective changes, as an early warning sign. Once alerted, 
the offender is then able to implement an effective coping strategy. 
Therefore, in sex offenders the AVE is unlikely to mediate the lapse-
relapse transition, at least as far as highly motivated but untreated child 
molesters are concerned. What is possible however, is that for these men 
having both lapsed, relapsed, and experienced the AVE at this second point, 
the transition is enhanced to what I have called relapse-two (Ward, 
Hudson, & Marshall, 1992), that is, a return to previous levels of offending 
behaviour. It is also possible that the AVE facilitates more extreme 
offending behaviour within the same episode, such that rather than 
stopping after an initial act, the offender escalates his behaviour both in 
terms of severity and intrusiveness. 
The third major finding, as stated above, is that there is support for 
different types of AVE. This confirms the importance of, at least at this 
early stage, of working with a number of definitions. Those subjects 
exhibiting an A VE with high levels of positive as well as negative emotion 
are an interesting group. It seems that some men appear to experience 
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conflicting emotions following relapse, although they may move between 
contrasting emotional states rather than experience different emotions 
simultaneously. Pithers (1990), in contrast to Marlatt, includes the PIG as an 
integral component of the A VE, and it may be that this group reflects the 
dual influence of both these factors. Although there are conceptual 
difficulties with this, as argued in chapter three, it does appear to reflect an 
important process for some child molesters. There remains the problem, 
however, of spelling out the relationship between the AVE and the PIG. 
The fourth major finding of this study as far as the AVE is concerned, 
is that the PIG or NAVE occurs in a significant number of men (13) at the 
lapse point, and may be undermining any AVE effect. This may reflect the 
impact of sexual arousal and the presence of predominantly positive 
emotions at this stage .. This finding suggests that it is important to consider 
the role of appetitive processes at the lapse stage in untreated child 
molesters (Rohsenow et aL, 1991) as well as cognitive and affective 
variables. As I have argued above, the kind of factors that (in other RP 
models), normally function to mediate the transition from a HRS to a lapse, 
now operate at the lapse point. This means that attribution independent 
affects, such as the positive emotions associated with sexual arousal, may 
play an important, and perhaps neglected, role in reoffending. 
(b) Attributional dimensions across the offence chain 
There were no significant differences across the scenario segments for 
the four attributional dimensions. It is not clear why this is the case, and is 
contrary to my initial expectations. It is at least possible that within the 
relatively narrow confines of their deviant sexual behaviour these mens' 
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causal beliefs concerning this aspect of their behaviour are consistent in 
terms of attributional dimensions and are therefore relatively stable. Of 
course it is only meaningful to speak of attributional style if the outcomes 
across the offence chain are perceived to be of similar valence. If the 
outcomes are perceived as fluctuating between positive and negative 
valence then it is not possible to infer the existence of an attributional style. 
For many of these men there was a major shift from a positive emotional 
state to a negative one at the relapse point and therefore the valence of the 
outcomes changed (see later in discussion). Attributional style refers to the 
tendency to interpret positive or negative outcomes in an enduring way, for 
example consistently interpreting a negative outcome as reflecting internal, 
stable and global causal dimensions and/or the outcomes as external, 
unstable and specific. 
Differentiated according to the presence or absence of the A VE the 
groups showed some but not all the expected differences on the 
attributional dimensions. The AVE group, in comparison to the NAVE 
subjects, saw the causes of their deviant sexual behaviour as more 
uncontrollable, and more stable. This is partially in accord with Marlatt and 
Gordon's suggestion (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985), although there was no 
difference between the two groups on the remaining attributional 
dimensions. Although it is dangerous to interpret trends, the A VE group 
tended to make more global attributions, which is consistent with Marlatt's 
formulation of the A VB. 
Looking more specifically at the pairs of attributional dimensions, it is 
interesting to observe that the subjects were grouped more or less equally 
into the four cells. This supports the utility of investigating the various 
attributional pathways to lapse and relapse separately. Marlatt tends to 
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emphasise the AVE pathway to relapse and underestimates the importance 
of the other attributional dimensions. If Marlatt was correct then you 
would expect to see a greater number of subjects in the internal-
uncontrollable cell, rather than, as was the case, an equal distribution across 
. 
all four possibilities. 
(dEmotions across the offence chain 
The significant differences in emotional responses across the scenario 
segments (lapse and relapse in particular) were as expected. Interest showed 
a significant decrease at the relapse point while disgust, hostility, fear, 
shyness and guilt all showed significant increases. It also appears that the 
emotions move in concert, with trends towards most negative emotions 
increasing over the offence chain and positive emotions decreasing. It is 
possible that this reflects an order effect. This is unlikely because the major 
shift occurs between steps 2 and 3 rather than as a linear trend as would be 
expected if this effect was simply due to an order effect. The fact that 
emotions changed across the offerice chain and that attributional 
dimensions did not (ignoring the issue of valence), suggests that they are 
more sensitive indicators or markers of the AVE. It also emphasises the 
importance of including an emotional measure when assessing the AVE. 
The differences in emotions between the AVE and NAVE groups 
were also as expected with most negative emotions being higher in the 
AVE group along with lower positive emotion scores. The reverse was the 
case for the NAVE group. The large number of subjects exhibiting a NAVE 
at the lapse point indicates the important role positive emotions play in 
facilitating offending. This has clearly been underestimated by previous 
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research and is supportive of an appetitive-motivational approach to 
relapse. 
(d) Relationship between attributional dimensions and emotions 
There were no significant relationships between any of the individual 
emotions and the pairs of attributional dimensions. This does not support 
Weiner's theory, however the major problem in this study is most likely a 
lack of subject numbers, that is, a lack of power with respect to these 
subsidiary hypotheses. When a comparison is made between shame and 
guilt it is interesting to note that the means reflect the hypothesised trends, 
that is, for shame, attributions tend to be internal-uncontrollable, whereas 
for guilt they tend to be internal-controllable. But it can be misleading to 
interpret trends and further research with sex offenders is necessary to 
clarify this issue. 
(e) Offender type and the AVE 
Contrary to my hypothesis there were no differences between fixated and 
regressed offenders with respect to the frequency with which they experienced 
an A VE. There was a trend for regressed subjects to be more likely to experience 
an A VB after both lapse and relapse than fixated subjects (5 and 2 for a lapse and 
12 and 6 for relapse, respectively) but the small number of subjects available for 
analysis at this point precluded any statistical significance, and therefore no 
conclusions can be reached. The AVE does occur, in both fixated and regressed 
offenders, but as previously noted (Ward, Hudson, & Marshall, 1992a) it tends 
to be at the point of relapse rather than after a lapse. 
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The differences in emotions between the two groups were as expected. 
Generally fixated subjects reported significantly higher levels of positive 
emotions and lower levels of negative emotions than regressed subjects. This 
highlights the importance of assessing both positive and negative emotions, as 
well as attributions. Emotions are likely to be good markers for the underlying 
attributions and cognitive processes. In any event there are additional reasons 
for emotions to be assessed; recent work has emphasised the role of emotion in 
cognitive behaviour therapy. Some researchers argue that to access 
therapeutically relevant cognitions it is often necessary to experience the 
relevant emotion (Greenberg & Safran, 1987). 
The greater degree of perceived stability of cause by fixated subjects was as 
predicted. This perception of stability has considerable treatment implications. 
It is likely that confronting the implicit beliefs embodied in these perceptions of 
stable cause forms a first step in the change process. Less effort needs to be 
directed at these processes in regressed offenders. 
As expected, fixated offenders who experience an AVE at relapse, see the 
cause of their offending as more stable than do regressed offenders experiencing 
an AVE. These data further support the notion of stability defining sub-types of 
effect. This contrasts with Weiner's view that stability merely acts as a 
magnifier, but is in accord with Marlatt's suggestion that perceptions of stable 
cause are directly associated with an AVE. These data reflect the important role 
that entrenched pedophilic beliefs play in the offending lifestyle of fixated child 
sex offenders (Groth et al., 1982; Salter, 1988) and additionally lend some 
empirical support to the validity of the classification into fixated and regressed 
types of offenders. 
Also as expected fixated offenders experiencing the AVE at the point of 
relapse, report higher stability than fixated subjects not showing the AVE. 
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These data further highlight the importance of addressing perceived stability, 
particularly in relation to the AYE. Regressed offenders experiencing an AVE 
were discriminable from the remaining regressed subjects only in terms of their 
report of greater uncontrollability. This reflects that those subjects experiencing 
as AVE were more likely to feel less in control. 
These findings have significant implications for therapists. The various 
subtypes of offenders pose particular problems. The least difficulties are likely 
to be posed by regressed offenders that experience an AYE at the point of lapse, 
followed by those that at least do so at relapse. This type of offender is 
experiencing negative emotions, reflecting at least some discomfort with his 
behaviour, and making internal, uncontrollable attributions. The major 
therapeutic task is to challenge the perceived lack of controllability. Next in 
increasing order of difficulty are regressed NA YES. While these offenders do 
not differ from other regressed subjects in terms of stability and globality 
judgements they are, by definition not showing negative affect, reflecting a 
degree of comfort with their offending. These men need to be persuaded 
regarding the unacceptability of their behaviour. 
Next in order of difficulty are fixated offenders that experience an AVE at 
lapse or at least relapse. These men are experiencing negative affect and 
internal attributions, and therefore are open to the consequent motivating 
effects, although they also see the cause as uncontrollable, stable and global, 
which poses a substantial therapeutic challenge. Highest in order of difficulty 
are those fixated offenders who do not experience that AVE at any point in the 
relapse process. While these men make less stable and global attributions 
regarding the cause of their offending behaviour, they experience less negative 
and more positive affect. It is likely that the therapy process must first start by 
persuading these men about the negative consequences of their behaviour on 
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their victims, and improve their ability to take a victim's perspective, before 
tackling the further issues of perceived cause. It is still an open question 
whether these offenders will pass through a stage of reporting increased stability 
judgements as they come to accept the impact on victims. There may be a 
progression of stages where these men come, as an interim step, to resemble 
those fixated subjects who do experience an AVE; it is also possible that they 
may move to more resemble the regressed subjects in this study. In any event, 
it seems likely that these different sub-types of offenders will pose differing 
therapeutic tasks, at least initially. 
(f) Reasons for offending 
The major reason subjects gave for their sexual offending was sexual 
arousal, followed by the need for intimacy or emotional closeness. At the 
lapse point sexual arousal or motivation was also given as the major reason 
or cause for their behaviour. There was a steady increase in the reporting of 
sexual arousal as the primary reason for behaviour across the three break 
points, although it was not significant, (from ten to 20) from step one to 
relapse. Overall, sexual arousal and secondly, the need for intimacy, 
emerged as significant reasons for behaving in a sexually aggressive way. 
Eight, (combining both positive and negative emotions) men reported that 
affective changes provided reasons either for their offending or behaviour 
associated with their offending. Although this was not statistically 
significant when compared with the other reasons given, it is consistent 
with Pithers (1990) claim (although not to the same extent) that the typical 
relapse sequence, or processes associated with sexual offending, is initiated 
by negative affect. But it seems that he has underemphasized the 
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importance of sexual arousal. The data also suggests that positive affect 
plays an important role in sexual offending. It may be that this is an 
underestimation of the influence of affect as emotions accompanied the 
lapse and relapse points and in this respect influenced behaviour even 
though they were not cited as reasons. This raises an important issue to 
keep in mind when assessing reasons or causes for behaviour. An 
individual may not identify emotions as constituting the primary reason 
for his behaviour even though they accompany, and are associated with, 
other reasons. 
An interesting finding is the reporting of anger, or the issue of power 
and dominance, as a primary reason for offending for a small number of 
men. Unfortunately the number citing this as a reason (two and three at 
lapse and relapse respectively) was insufficient to establish (statistically) 
whether anger tends to be associated with external attributions. I included 
anger or power as a separate category rather than as part of negative affect. 
For one thing, it isn't clear whether anger is universally perceived by 
people as negative. 
The fact that the need for intimacy or emotional closeness motivated 
some men's offending is certainly consistent with the prevailing theories 
and research in the area of sexual aggression (Marshall, 1989). A number of 
clinicians and researchers in the area have commented on the difficulty sex 
offenders have in intimate relationships (Marshall, 1989; Marshall & 
Barbaree, 1989; Marshall & Barbaree, 1990b). More specifically these men 
appear to be intimidated by adult relationships and seek to establish 
relationships with children whom they perceive as more accepting and less 
rejecting. Some theorists have hypothesised that such a deficit tends to 
predispose men to pedophilia (Marshall, 1989). Typically this reason was 
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accompanied by sexual arousal; recall that the subjects were asked for the 
reasons for their behaviour and that some men gave more than one. 
(g) Offender type and reasons 
There does not appear to be any relationship between offender type 
and the kind of reasons given for either sexual offending or behaviour 
associated with offending. This is not particularly surprising as according to 
Weiner (1986) attributional dimensions are more likely than reasons to be 
associated with emotions and expectations, and therefore behaviour. In 
addition, reasons are more likely to reflect social desirability concerns than 
ca usal dimensions. 
Finally, there are two more general issues raised by this study that are 
worth briefly mentioning. Assessment of the changes in causal attributions 
induced by therapy is an important part of a comprehensive outcome 
evaluation. Clinicians have frequently remarked on the important role 
attributions and distorted thinking play in legitimising offending and 
setting up HRSs (pithers, 1990). Therefore it is sensible to include an 
assessment of attributions and attributional dimensions as part of treatment 
evaluation. 
This method constitutes an assessment device that has the potential to 
provide an individual offender's profile of causal perceptions of his 
behaviour at the various steps in the relapse chain. As such it aids risk 
assessment at any point, but particularly after intervention; therapy is 
hardly complete if despite other changes in attitudes and skills, an offender 
persists in not accepting the lapse as the point of concern, or is still making 
uncontrollable causal ascription's. This method makes explicit the 
motivational aspects of both attributions and emotions; and it is 
motivation that is central to abstinence. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
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In this project I set out to test the AVE hypothesis in child molesters. It is 
an exploratory piece of research and not an experiment. It makes sense 
to first establish whether there is evidence for a phenomenon such as the 
AVE in child offenders before initiating a larger, experimental study. 
Therefore because of the exploratory nature of this research, there are 
some inevitable limitations that I will now address. 
Given the design of the study (see Method - Chapter 5), there is no 
way of being certain that the subjects were committed to "abstinence" at 
the time of their offence. Therefore it is arguable that the RP model does 
not apply to them as it is not clear that they were breaking their restraint 
rules. This is a descriptive study and one of my aims is to obtain data 
concerning the possible occurrence of the AVE in sex offenders. It is 
legitimate to assume the RP models relevance as a starting point and 
gather data on the existence or nonexistence of the AVE. It is also 
reasonable to assume that the majority of the subjects were aware of, 
(and arguably committed to obeying) the strict taboos against sex with 
children in our culture. The breaking or violation of these rules could 
therefore lead to the AVE. 
Marlatt (1989, 1985a, 1985b) formulated the AVE as a dimensional 
construct and therefore it could be argued that by establishing an AVE cutoff 
point this effect has been artificially created or even obscured. A problem 
with investigating the AVE in sex offenders is the difficulty in creating 
121 
lapse-relapse situations to identity its presence. It is clearly ethically 
unacceptable to ask offenders to monitor these situations in their natural 
environment. A common research strategy in other addictions is to 
compare eventuallapsers and relapsers on the relevant measures of the 
A VE and ascertain whether its presence is able to discriminate between the 
two groups. This is not possible with sex offenders and therefore to create 
situations where the AVE might occur it is necessary to use an analogue 
design and attempt to identify the hypothesised cognitive-affective 
processes. This approach involves establishing a cutoff point or criterion to 
differentiate between those subjects who experience an AVE and those who 
do not. Although subjects were placed into high or low groups on the 
independent dimensions of attributions, and positive and negative affect, it 
was still possible to obtain a nonsignificant result where the obtained 
groups occurred by chance. These results support the existence of an AVE 
in child molesters. An additional point is that because the range of the 
attribution and emotion scores is sufficiently wide it is permissible to use a 
median split to divide the groups. 
It is possible that by requiring the subjects to report reasons or causes 
for their behaviour at each breakpoint they have been trapped into a causal 
search. That is, asked to complete a task that would not have occurred in 
their natural environment. According to Weiner (1986, 1985) people 
spontaneously engage in an attributional search following important, 
negative, or unexpected outcomes. It is arguable that sexual activity with 
children, or behaviour associated with such activity, would usually start an 
attributional search; an individual would attempt to explain to himself why 
he behaved as he did. It is reasonable to assume that such behaviour would 
be perceived as important or even negative in view of the cultural norms 
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(and of course laws) forbidding sex with children. Perhaps this issue 
interacts with offender type, with preferential or fixated child molesters 
more likely to view sex with children as important rather than negative or 
unexpected, while situational or regressed offenders would display the 
reverse pattern, but still see it as important. 
Perhaps splitting the subjects into high and low positive/negative 
emotion groups created a misleading picture, that is, mistakenly implied 
that the subjects were experiencing strong emotions. The difficulty here is 
that if the means of the individual emotions are low then classifying 
subjects into high/low groups based upon a median split can be somewhat 
artificial. Therefore, it is arguable that the AVE (at least its emotional 
component) did not occur in any meaningful sense and that it was simply 
an artefact of the experimental situation. This is unlikely as most subjects 
found the task of "reliving" their offence upsetting and emotionally 
evocative. In addition the (group) mean scores reported during the 
different breakpoints are comparable to the norms supplied by Izard et al., 
(1974). The range of scores on the various subscales, from 5 to 15, also 
suggests that this was not a problem. The major shift in the intensity of the 
emotional response occurred at the point of relapse which suggests that the 
subjects were affectively engaged in the experimental task. 
One of the major problems when applying the RP model to sex 
offenders is defining when a lapse occurs. Individuals only engage in an 
attributional search following an outcome that is perceived to be important, 
negative or unexpected. The difficulty is that while sex offending will 
clearly initiate such a search it is not clear that a lapse would, at least if it is 
defined in the way Pithers (1990) suggests. The problem in defining a lapse 
also means that it is difficult to be certain it had been identified and 
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therefore included in the study. But the marked shifts in emotion and 
attributional dimensions that occurred make this interpretation unlikely. 
Typically a person experiences a number of lapses before relapsing and 
therefore you would expect to observe some evidence of this, provided of 
course an AVE was experienced. 
Given the nature of the design used in this research it is not possible 
to conclude that attributions caused the emotional responses as 
hypothesised by Marlatt. However, in view of the lack of evidence for the 
existence of post event specific attributions and emotions it is important to 
first obtain some basic data on these processes before attempting to establish 
in what direction the causal influences work. 
It could be argued that it is misleading to collapse individual emotions 
into positive and negative categories when defining the AVE. In reply to 
this objection, Marlatt generally speaks of emotions in broad terms 
(negative or positive affect) rather than identifying them individually. 
Other influential researchers into relapse do likewise (Rohsenow et al., 
1988; Niaura et al., 1991). At this time we lack basic knowledge concerning 
the role of emotion in relapse and its constituent processes. It is a useful 
first step to identify broad trends and phenomena and then undertake more 
fine grained analyses. Factor analytic studies have found that there are two 
secondary factors underlying the DES basic emotions. Factor one is basically 
defined by a combination of negative mood states and factor two by positive 
mood states (Boyle, 1987; Boyle & Katz, 1991). In light of this research, it is 
permissible to collapse the basic emotions into the categories of positive and 
negative affect. 
Another possible objection concerns the analysis of the AVE using 
three types, Marlatt's A VEa (high attributions, high negative affect and low 
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positive affect), A VBb (high attributions, high negative and high positive 
affect) and EAVE (an emotional A VB with high negative affect and low 
positive affect). It could be argued that in using three types of the A VE I am 
simply stretching the definition to fit the data and that it would be simpler 
to just use Marlatt's definition. There has been relatively little empirical 
research in the AVE and therefore we have rather a limited understanding 
of this phenomenon and its component processes. It is therefore important 
to spread the net widely to capture all the relevant data. This will help 
researchers to build better theories and lead to more fruitful empirical 
investigations. It is also dear that there is a conceptual link among the 
three forms of the AVE. They all involve negative affect, while A YEa and 
A VEb share high attributions, and AVEa and EA VB both involve low 
positive and high negative affect. As argued above, there are conceptual 
problems with Marlatt's formulation and it seems sensible to be guided in 
future work by the kind of AVE construct (and the related attributional 
pathways) outlined in this thesis. Marlatt appears to have missed some 
important attribution-lapse/relapse relationships and therefore some 
important phenomena. For example, those offenders who report both high 
levels of negative and positive affect along with the relevant attributions 
(AVEb). As discussed above, this is similar to what Pithers (1990) calls the 
PIG. 
There is the problem of external validity, that is, is it permissible to 
generalise from a prison based population of child molesters to child 
molesters in general? Certainly, there is evidence that outpatient sex 
offenders are more representative of the general population of sexual 
assaulters than incarcerated ones (Abel & Rouleau, 1990). The majority of 
sex offenders do not end up within the prison system. Therefore it is 
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possible that these findings only apply to men convicted and incarcerated 
for their sexual crimes. 
An additional issue is that of motivation, all the men included in this 
study were awaiting treatment for their sexual offences and were therefore 
motivated to change their attitudes and behaviour. This may have 
influenced their willingness to focus their attention on the events 
associated with the sexual assault and therefore increased the chances of an 
AVE occurring. It could be objected, that while the phenomenon is real in 
the sense that the subjects genuinely experienced the thoughts and feelings 
reported, it may not have occurred at the time of the actual offence(s). The 
presence of such processes as cognitive deconstruction (see discussion 
below) may have further reduced either the chances of an AVE occurring at 
all or perhaps reduced its intensity. Clinicians and researchers in the area of 
sexual offending have noted the persistence of distorted attitudes, beliefs 
and thinking in men in treatment for their sexual aggression. Certainly, a 
common clinical impression is that cognitive distortions perSist until they 
are explicitly challenged (Murphy, 1990; Pithers, 1990). Therefore, it is 
arguable, that despite being in treatment child molesters exhibit the same 
kind of cognitive distortions as those that existed at the time of their 
offending. 
There are limitations in this study, but the important thing is to begin 
to gather data on phenomena such as the AVE in sex offenders. To start 
with incarcerated offenders is a sensible strategy because of the relative ease 
in researching this population. However, to build up our knowledge about 
the general population of sex offenders, it is necessary to extent this kind of 
research to outpatient populations. 
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Additional problems of generalizability include the lack of subjects 
from other ethnic groups and the absence of intellectually borderline or 
retarded offenders. In fact the subjects used in this study appear to be 
particularly bright. Concerning the ethnic composition of the sample, there 
were simply no men from other ethnic groups who met the criteria. No 
one was excluded upon the basis of ethnicity. There was however, a 
decision to exclude subjects who were of ~order1ine intelligence or who 
were illiterate. It was felt that in view of the exploratory nature of this 
research, it would be easier initially to recruit subjects who would find the 
verbal nature of the task relatively (intellectually) undemanding. 
The sample size in this study, while adequate for assessing the 
existence of the AVE, was probably insufficient for some of the secondary 
analyses, for example, the investigation of the relationship between 
attributional dimensions and emotions. The major focus of this research 
project was to provide an empirical test of the AVE in child molesters, 
more specifically, incarcerated offenders. The investigation of attribution-
emotion-links was merely a secondary concern. The problem regarding this 
secondary analysis, was the lack of the necessary number of subjects to 
adequately test out Weiner's theory regarding the relationships between 
dimensions and emotions (Weiner, 1986). While there are trends in the 
data consistent with his hypotheses, a lack of subjects has precluded 
stronger conclusions. The other issue of relevance is that the labour 
intensiveness of the methodology used in this study made it practically 
impossible to work with the number of subjects necessary to clarify this 
important problem. 
The classification of offenders into fixated/regressed types has been 
criticised on both conceptual and empirical grounds (Knight & Prentky, 
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1990; Simon et a1., 1992). Simon et al., (1992) research into the validity of 
the fixated/regressed dichotomy suggests that a unimodal and continuous 
distribution rather than a bimodal one (as suggested by Groth's theory) is 
more appropriate. 
At this point our understanding of the different types of sex offenders 
is quite limited. It is sensible to work with a number of classification 
systems (if they have some apparent value) at the same time (Hooker, 1987). 
The fixated/regressed (or the related preferential/situational) dichotomy 
has clinical face validity and arguably is of some use at this preliminary 
stage of theory development. One of its virtues is its relative ease of 
application. Although there appear to be distinct developmental 
. antecedents to different types of sexual offending (Knight & Prentky, 1990), 
it is not necessary to accept the psychodynamic assumptions of the Groth et 
al., (1982) system. 
As stated above, the sample is too small to use a sophisticated system 
of classification such as that of Knight & Prentky (1990). Their use of two 
axes, degree of fixation and amount of contact, in conjunction with further 
classification according to social competence, meaning of contact, degree of 
injury inflicted, and presence of sadistic motives, yielded 24 possible cells. 
Studies so far have indicated that 11 of the possible cells are virtually empty 
and therefore of very little clinical value (Knight & Prentky, 1990). The 
fixated/regressed and preferential/situational types appear to map onto 
some of the cells of the MTC:CM3, although in a more complex way. For 
example the" typical" fixated or preferential offender would be highly 
fixated (high level of pedophilic interest) on axis one and have a high 
degree of contact on axis two. Of course there are exceptions and this is one 
of the reasons Knight & Prentky have developed a more complex system of 
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classification. They argue that the fixated/regressed dichotomy confounds 
style of offending, relationship with the victim, intensity of pedophilic 
interests and level of social competence (Knight & Prentky, 1990). 
FUTIJRE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
The A VE construct appears to play an important role in facilitating the 
transition from a lapse to a relapse in addictive disorders. However in 
untreated sex offenders it occtirs more frequently at the point of relapse and 
may determine whether or not an offender continues to offend or increase 
the severity of his offending. A key therapeutic task is teaching sex 
offenders to regard the lapse as being of crucial importance in providing an 
early warning sign. Ina sense this means training offenders to experience 
some form of A VE at the lapse stage instead of relapse. Further research 
would be helpful in assessing the value of this clinical strategy in 
minimising the chances of sexual aggression. An obvious question 
concerns whether the AVE will actually occur at the lapse point following 
such training. 
The most useful way in which to define the AVE needs further 
research. Is it necessary to include all four attributional dimensions when 
operationalising this construct? Is it better to combine the dimensions as 
Curry et al., (1987) do or should each dimension be analysed separately? 
Perhaps it would be possible to define it purely in emotional terms because 
of the tendency of sex offenders to exhibit cognitive distortions. Are there 
different forms of the AVE as suggested in this study? These are all 
important problems that need to be addressed soon. 
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It would also be a valuable extension of research into the A \r'E to 
follow offenders through treatment and assess whether or not the AVE 
diminishes in intensity or changes in any way as a result of therapy. Of 
particular interest would be the impact of specific treatment components 
such as cognitive restructuring and victim empathy on the individual 
components of the AVE. Larsen (1992) demonstrated that the attributional 
dimensions of sex offenders change in a more adaptive direction during a 
cognitive-behavioural programme. However she did not assess emotions 
along with attributions. 
Recent research and conceptual work in both the social cognitive and 
sex offenders area has highlighted the importance of integrating different 
models to deepen our understanding of relapse processes. For example the 
relationship between the A VE and cognitive construction is poorly 
understood. The concept of cognitive deconstruction was explicitly 
developed by Baumeister (1990, 1991) in his recent work on suicide, 
alcoholism, sexual masochism and binge eating. His key argument is that 
people attempt to escape from the burden or implications of self-awareness 
by narrowing their focus of attention to relatively concrete levels. A 
primary assumption is that when individuals' behaviour or situation falls 
short of their expectations, they will attempt to explain it, that is, engage in 
an attributional search. If a causal attribution is made to internal aspects of 
the self, the person compares the outcome to relevant self-standards. This 
results in heightened self-awareness and the subsequent experiencing of 
negative emotions if the self is perceived as inadequate and responsible for 
the failure. The individual may attempt to escape from this self-
evaluation, and the associated negative emotions, by shifting to a lower 
level of meaning or action identification. In a cognitively deconstructed 
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state, self-awareness is more concrete, the time perspective is narrowed, and 
behaviour is guided by proximal as opposed to distal goals. 
The AVE may show quite a complex relationship to cognitively 
deconstructed states. For example, once a person has lapsed, he may shift 
from a cognitively deconstructed state, begin an attributional search, and 
experience an AVE. This in turn has a number of effects on ongoing 
behaviour depending on its intensity and the type of attributional 
dimensions involved. Secondly, following a brief AVE, the offender may 
attempt to escape self-awareness and associated negative affect by further 
addictive behaviour or changes that increase the chances of addictive 
behaviour in the future (other high risk situations and apparently 
irrelevant decisions). Thirdly, an offender may not experience an AVE at 
all, remaining in a deconstructed state and continuing his offensive 
behaviour. Finally he may be fully aware of the situation but continue to 
offend even though he no longer experiences a state of cognitive 
deconstruction. This may involve, for example, blaming external factors or 
other persons for the lapse. 
It would also be useful to integrate the RP model, essentially a social 
learning perspective, with the influential behavioural theories of relapse in 
the addictions area. The major behavioural models (as discussed above) 
emphasise the importance of the conditioned response in relapse when 
exposed to drug related cues (Niaura et aI., 1988; Rohsenow et a1., 1991). 
Besides withdrawal cues, the incentive value of drugs is increasingly 
thought to playa predominant role in substance abuse and relapse. The 
recent exponents of these models (Niaura et al., 1988; Rohsenow et a1., 1991) 
view relapse as a complex process involving multiple cues and 
mechanisms, including cognitive factors. While Marlatt does include 
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conditioning processes in his RP model he tends to emphasise the primary 
role of cognitive variables. Future research could establish whether or not 
the behavioural models of relapse are applicable to sex offenders and, if so, 
how the conditioning and cognitive variables combine to lead to relapse. 
It is necessary to clarify whether or not the various mechanisms 
thought to mediate the transition from HRSs to a lapse work collectively or 
independently. Perhaps, as discussed above, different mechanisms work in 
conjunction with different types of HRSs. Another area for future research 
concerns whether external HRSs are more likely to lead to a lapse. If this is 
supported by the evidence, then it may make more sense to label internal 
processes such as negative emotional states as risk factors and reserve the 
term HRSs for external situations associated with relapse. 
Another important area' for future research concerns the assessment 
of causal attributions in clinical settings. The method used in this thesis, 
while extremely useful, is somewhat time consuming. If offenders do 
display relatively stable attributions concerning their offending, then it may 
be just as clinically useful to simply administer a questionnaire such as the 
4-ADS during assessment and following treatment. 
As discussed above it is important to extend this line of research to 
outpatient populations of sexual offenders. This is necessary to establish 
whether the AVE occurs in all sex offenders or only in incarcerated (child 
molesters) offenders awaiting treatment. It is also necessary to extend this 
research to different ethnic groups and intellectually disabled or illiterate 
offenders, to clarify whether the A VE plays a role in the offending or 
reoffending of these men. We know relatively little about the cognitive 
processes that mediate other kinds of sexual offending, such as rape or 
exhibitionism. It would be useful to explore whether or not the AVE and 
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its related processes occur in these types of offences. Besides increasing our 
understanding of these serious and socially costly problems, such 
knowledge may well lead to more powerful treatment methods. 
The methodology and analogue design used in the study could 
fruitfully be used to study the psychological mechanisms underlaying 
different types of addictions, for example, narcotic addiction. Considering 
the limited amount of empirical research investigating the A VE, this kind 
of approach could provide a valuable way of identifying the cognitive and 
affective processes that lead both to relapse and initial abuse. It could also 
be extended to some of the areas more recently included within the RP 
approach, such as violence and interpersonal problems, (Wilson, 1992). 
The relationships between the attributional dimensions and specific 
emotions could be further investigated. This would require relatively large 
numbers and it may be easier to simply administer the attribution and 
emotion measures in questionnaire form, without creating vignettes. It 
would be particularly interesting to examine the relationship between 
external locus and anger in rapists or those child molesters who are 
particularly aggressive. As discussed in the criticism of Marlatt's version of 
the A VE, he appears to have missed some important attribution-
lapse/relapse links, for example, where an offender either blames the 
victim for the offence or behaviour associated with it. 
It would also be worthwhile to further investigate the validity and 
advantages of subdividing the external-uncontrollable dimensional pair 
into a non-person and person cause. As stated earlier, Weiner maintains 
that "controllable" means controllable by anyone. He views the person 
cause as an example of an external-controllable attribution rather than, as 
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assumed in this study, as an external-uncontrollable attribution (person 
cause). This is an empirical and conceptual issue and merits further study. 
Concerning the issue of classification, it is imperative to replicate this 
study using more sophisticated typology's. Simon et al., (1992) suggest 
either using alternative conceptualisation's or modifying the Groth et al 
(1982) theory. This would require the introduction of a dimensional 
perspective and the incorporation of other important variables, such as the 
offenders prior nonsex criminal record, his age and his relationship with 
the victim. 
Finally, the complexity of the processes associated with the AVE and 
their possible instability has already been alluded to. The next step is to 
increase our knowledge base concerning these and in addition, shed light 
on the more general cognitive and emotional mediators of sexual 
aggression. This knowledge will help to develop more powerful theories of 
initial offending and relapse, and in turn, lead to more sophisticated and 
effective therapeutic strategies. Ultimately these will reduce the prevalence 
of sexual offences and increase the safety and therefore the emotional 
wellbeing of both women and children. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
Consent Form 
Brief Description of the Project: 
The aim of this project is to assess thoughts and feelings associated with sexual 
offending. It will involve you filling out some self-report scales, listening to an 
audiotape describing sexual offending and answering some questions about your reaction 
to this. 
Risks Associated with Participation: 
There are no particular risks assoc~ated with this research project. It is essentially an 
expanded assessment. However, time will be made available after each assessment 
session to talk through any distressing thoughts or feelings you may experience. 
Time Required: 
Approximately six hours. 
Name of Researcher: 
Supervisor: 
Tony Ward 
DrSMHudson 
Prof K Strongman 
I agree to participate in the project described above on the understanding that, if at any 
time, I wish to withdraw from the project I may do so and this will not affect my access 
to treatment. All data will be kept confidential and the identity of participants will not be 
revealed. 
Signature: 
151 
APPEND1X2 
MODIFIED 4-ADS (Benson, 1989) 
Dare: ________________________ __ 
No: 1 2 3 4 
This form helps us to understand more about peoples' reasons for sexual offending. I 
This is not a rest and there are no right or wrong answers. 
1. What is the reason for your behaviour right now? 
Next, we would like to know what you think about the reasons you wrore down above. 
1) Are the reasons you wrote down things 
that: . . . ' 
5) Are these reasons things that are: 
____ A lot about you; 
___ Will stay the same over time; ___ A little about you; 
____ Can change only a little over time; ___ About you and about the 
___ Can change a fair amount over time; circumstance; 
___ Can change a lot over time; ___ A little about the circumstance; 
___ Will change a lot over time. _____ A lot about the circumstance. 
2) Are these reasons things that: 6) Do you think the reason above would: 
___ Don't have an~ing to do with you; ____ Never again be present; 
___ Have to do wi you only a little; ____ Rarely be present again; 
___ Have to do with you a fair amount; ____ Sometimes be present again; 
___ Have a lot to do with you; ____ Usually be present again; 
___ Have everything to do with you. ____ Always be present. 
3) Are these reasons that you: 7) Are these reasons things that happen to 
___ Can completely control; 
___ Have a lot of control over; 
you: 
_____ Very often in different situations; 
___ Have some control over; ____ Often in different situations; 
___ Have only a little control over; ___ Sometimes in different situations; 
___ Cannot control at all. _____ Rarely in different situations; 
4) Are the reasons you gave things that: 
____ Very rarely in different situations. 
8) Are these reasons for which: 
__ Would happen only in this special 
situation; ___ You are not at all responsible; 
___ Would happen in a few similar ____ you are only a very little bit 
situations; responsible; 
____ Would happen in some similar ___ You are a little bit responsible; 
situations; ___ You are mostl~ responsible; 
___ Would happen in most similar ____ you are comp etely responsible. 
situations; 
___ Would happen in this kind of 
situation and in other situations. 
9) Do you think that these reasons: 
___ Could change only a little bit from 
one year to the next; 
___ Could change a little bit from one 
year to the next; 
___ Could change somewhat from one 
year to the next; 
___ Could change a lot from one year to 
the next; 
___ Could change very, very much from 
one year to the next. 
10) Are these reasons: 
___ Most about others; 
___ Partly about others; 
___ Both something about you and 
about others; 
___ Partly something about you; 
___ Mostly something about you. 
11) Are these reasons things that: 
___ You can completely control; 
___ You can control very much; 
___ You can control a fair amount; 
___ You can control only a little; 
___ You cannot control at all. 
12) Would these reasons be: 
___ True for you only in this special 
event; 
___ True for you in this event and in 
some other similar events; 
True for you in most similar events; 
___ True for you in most areas of your 
life; 
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___ True for you in all areas of your life. 
13) Are these reasons things that are: 
____ Completely inside you; 
___ Mostly inside you; 
___ A little inside and a little outside of 
___ ~~t outside of you; 
___ Completely outside of you. 
14) Are these reasons things that: 
__ Will probably change whole lot 
during a year; 
___ . t change a lot during a year; 
___ t change quite a bit during a 
year; 
___ Rarely change even a little during a 
year; 
___ Never change within a year. 
15) Are these reasons true for you: 
__ In most similar circumstances; 
__ In many similar circumstances; 
___ In some similar circumstances; 
___ Only in this type of circumstance; 
___ Only on this particular circumstance. 
16) Are the reasons things for which: 
___ You are responsible; 
___ You are only a very little bit 
responsible; 
____ you are a little bit responsible; 
____ you are partly responsible; 
____ you are very responsible. 
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APPENDIX 3 
Differential Emotions Scale (DES) 
Name: Date: 
-------------------------- ------------------
No: 1 2 3 4 
This scale consists of 36 phrases which describe different emotions. Please indicate the 
extent to which each phrase describes the way you feel at the present time. Record your 
answers by circling the appropriate number on the five-place scale following each word. 
Presented below is the scale for indicating the degree to which each word describes the 
way you feel. 
Very slightly 
or not at all slightly moderately 
I 2 3 
considerably 
4 
Very 
strongly 
5 
In deciding your answer to a given item, consider the emotion connoted or defmed by 
that word. Then, if at the present moment you feel that way very slightly or not at all, 
you would circle the number 1 on the scale; if you feel that way to a moderate degree, 
you would circle.3; if you feel that way very strongly, you w.ould circle .5., and so forth. 
Remember, you are requested to make your responses on the basis of the way you feel at 
this time. Work at a good pace. It is not necessary to ponder; the first answer you 
decide on for a given word is l'robably the most valid. 
very slighUy very 
or not at all slighUy moderately considerably strongly 
1) Feel regret, sorx about 1 2 3 4 5 
something you id. 
2) Feel sheepish, like you do 
not want to be seen. 
2 3 4 5 
3) Feel glad about something. 2 3 4 5 
4) Feel like something stinks, 2 3 4 5 
puts a bad taste in your 
mouth. 
5) Feel you can't stand 
yourself. 
2 3 4 5 
6) Feel embarrassed when 2 3 4 5 
anybody sees you make a 
mistake. 
7) Feel unhappd.' blue, 2 3 4 5 
downhearte . 
8) Feel surprised, like when 2 3 4 5 
something suddenly 
happens you had no idea 
would happen. 
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very slightly very 
or not at all slighUy moderately considerably strongly 
9) Feel like somebody is a 
low-life, not worth the time 
1 2 3 4 5 
of day. 
10) Feel shy, like you want to 2 3 4 5 
hide. 
11) Feel like what you're doing 2 3 4 5 
or watching is Interesting. 
12) Feel scared, uneasy, like 2 3 4 5 
something might hann you. 
13) Feel mad at somebody. 2 3 4 5 
14) Feel mad at yourself. 2 3 4 5 
15) Feel happy. 2 3 4 5 
16) Feel like somebody is a 2 3 4 5 
'good-for-nothing. 
17) Feel so interested in what 2 3 4 5 
you're doing that you're 
caught up in it. 
18) Feel amazed, like you can't 2 3 4 5 
believe what's happened, it 
was so unusual. 
19) Feel fearful, like you're in 
danger, very tense. 
2 3 4 5 
20) Feel like screaming at 2 3 4 5 
somebody or banging on 
something. 
21) Feel sad and ~Ioomy, 2 3 4 5 
almost like crying. 
22) Feel like you did something 2 3 4 5 
wrong. 
23) Feel bashful, embarrassed. 2 3 4 5 
24) Feel disgusted, like 2 3 4 5 
something is sickening. 
25) feel joyful, like everything 2 3 4 5 
IS gOing your way. 
26) Feel like people laugh at 2 3 4 5 
you. 
27) Feel like things are so 2 3 4 5 
rotten they could make you 
sick. 
28) Feel sick about yourself. 2 3 4 5 
29) Feel like you are better 
than somebody. 
2 3 4 5 
30) Feel like you ought to be 
blamed for something. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31) Feel the way you do when 2 3 4 5 
something unexpected 
happens .. 
32) Feel alert, curious, kind of 
excited about something. 
2 3 4 5 
33) Feel a~ry, irritated, 
annoy with somebody. 
2 3 4 5 
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very slighdy very 
or not at all slightly moderately considerably strongly 
34) Feel discouraged, like you 1 -2 3 4 5 
can't make it, nothing's 
going right. 
35) Feel afraid. 2 3 4 5 
36) Feel like people always 
look at you when anything 
2 3 4 5 
goes wrong. 
p.70 
line 4; p.119 bottom line. On page 23 there should be an "and" before 
classical conditioning on line 11. On page 28, paragraph 2 should read "I 
will make some preliminary criticisms concerning Marlatts versions of 
